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I. INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, a priority dispute between holders of competing security
interests under Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 ("U.C.C. Article 9") is resolved
in favor of the secured party that was the first creditor to file its financing statement or
perfect its security interest.' However, a different non-temporal rule may apply if one
of the security interests is a purchase-money security interest ("PMSI"). 2 One of
* Professor, South Texas College of Law (zinneck@stcl.edu). Robert M. Lloyd, professor
at the University of Tennessee College of Law, offered helpful comments on an early draft. My
employer graciously provided financial support.
1. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2004). Statutory citations are to U.C.C. Article 9 as revised in
2000 unless otherwise indicated ("former").
2. U.C.C. Article 9 refers to "purchase-money security interests." See U.C.C. § 9-103.
Former U.C.C. Article 9 refers to "purchase money security interests." See former U.C.C. § 9-107.
Unless the term appears in a quoted passage, I have elected to use the hyphenated form throughout
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these non-temporal rules affords the second-in-time creditor with first-in-line status,
the so-called "super-priority" rule, if the creditor has timely perfected a PMSI "in
goods other than inventory or livestock.",
3
The application of this super-priority rule was at the heart of the analysis in
Textron Financial Corp. v. United Financial Group, Inc. (In re Alphatech Systems,
Inc.), a decision recently rendered by a three-judge panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.4 Textron involved a priority dispute between two
secured creditors, each claiming a perfected security interest in a piece of the
bankrupt debtor's equipment.5 One creditor claimed priority based on its earlier
filing and its after-acquired property clause while the other creditor alleged super-
priority as a holder of a timely perfected PMSI.6 The appellate panel affirmed earlier
decisions by the bankruptcy court and the district court by awarding priority to the
initial creditor, concluding that the purchase-money creditor was not entitled to super-
priority because it had failed to timely file its financing statement.
In its eight-paragraph opinion, the Eleventh Circuit exposes itself to second-
guessing, if not criticism, on two important legal issues. After offering a purchase-
money primer in Part H and a summary of the Alphatech Systems opinion in Part III,
Part IV asserts that the circuitFanel failed to observe that the creditor asserting super-
priority did not have a PMSI. Part V questions the circuit panel's application of the
super-priority statute if the creditor held a PMSI, suggesting that the panel's analysis
was incomplete, if not wrong.9 Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. A PURCHASE-MONEY PRIMER
The typical PMSI under U.C.C. Article 9 arises in two common transactions. In
one transaction, Seller sells goods on credit to Buyer and retains an enforceable
security interest in those goods to secure repayment of the purchase price." This
this Article, even when discussing cases decided under former Article 9.
I have, on occasion, heard the acronym pronounced "pimzy," which explains its use in the title.
3. U.C.C. § 9-324(a).
4. 317 E3d 1267, 1268-69 (11 th Cir. 2003).
5. Id. at 1268.
6. Id
7. Id. at 1268-69.
8. See infra pp. 381-400.
9. See infra pp. 401-417.
10. U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (2004) ("A security interest in goods is a purchase-money security
interest: (1) to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security
interest[.]"); U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(1) (defining "purchase-money collateral" as "goods or software that
secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral"); U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2)
(defining "purchase-money obligation" as "an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the
price of the collateral"); see, e.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2004) (holding that
seller of automobile retained PMSI); Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Myers, 567 S.E.2d 641,645 (W.Va.
[Vol. 40:2
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may be viewed as direct financing, seller financing, or dealer financing. In the other
transaction, Buyer relies on a credit extension from Lender to purchase goods from
Seller, 1 while Lender takes an enforceable security interest in those goods to secure
repayment of the loan.' 2 This may be viewed as an enabling loan, bank financing, or
third-party financing.
The secured party may prefer to have a PMSI, rather than a generic security
interest, for a variety of reasons. Often, the law affords special treatment for
purchase-money security interests and their holders. For example, the Federal Trade
Commission's credit practices rules state that a secured party commits an "unfair act
or practice" by taking a non-possessory security interest in household goods unless
the security interest is a PMSI. 13 Also, the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to
avoid a non-possessory security interest in many consumer goods, professional texts,
tools of the trade, and certain health aids if the security interest impairs an exemption
to which the debtor is otherwise entitled, unless the security interest is a PMSI.'
4
But perhaps the most significant favortism is found in U.C.C. Article 9,
particularly in the areas of perfection and priority. For example, a secured party often
perfects its security interest in goods by filing a financing statement with the
appropriate state official.' 5 But if the collateral is a consumer good, a good "used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,"'16 and the
security interest is a PMSI, then the security interest is automatically perfected at the
moment when the security interest first becomes enforceable17-- commonly known
2002) (holding that seller of mobile home retained PMSI).
11. Buyer may use Lender's credit rather than Seller's credit for a variety of reasons. For
example, Buyer may find Lender's credit terms more attractive. Also, Buyer may be forced to seek
credit from Lender or another third party if Seller refuses to extend credit.
12. U.C.C. §§ 9-103(b)(1), -103(a)(1), -103(a)(2) (defining "purchase-money obligation" as
"an obligation of an obligor ... for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
the collateral if the value is in fact so used"); see, e.g., Friendly Fin. Corp. v. Orbit Chrysler Plymouth
Dodge Truck, Inc., 835 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Md. 2003) (lender held PMSI in vehicle purchased by
buyer and financed by lender); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Four Oaks Bank & Trust Co., 576
S.E.2d 722, 725 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (plaintiff held PMSI in drill rig engine purchased by debtor
with plaintiff's check).
13. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (2004).
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l)(B) (2001). The Bankruptcy Code also provides a secured
party holding a PMSI with a possible defense to the trustee's voidable preference challenge. See id
at § 547(c)(3).
15. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) & cmt. 2. The standard forms of an initial financing statement
(referred to as a UCC-1) and a subsequent amendment (known as a UCC-3) are found in U.C.C. § 9-
521.
Filing a financing statement is not the exclusive method of perfecting a security interest in
goods. See, e.g., id § 9-313(a). The secured party can also perfect its security interest by taking
possession of the goods; but one or both parties may find this option impractical. See id
16. Id. § 9-102(a)(23).
17. Id. § 9-309(1). Under former Article 9, some states enacted non-uniform laws that
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as "attachment."' 18 The secured party need not file a financing statement or take any
other action to perfect its PMSI in a consumer good.' 9
prohibited automatic perfection of a PMSI in a consumer good if the purchase price exceeded a
stated value. See Juliet M. Moringiello, A Tale of Two Codes: Examining § 5226) of the Bankruptcy
Code, § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Proper Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 863, 883 n. 160 (2001) (citing statutes).
18. U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b) (stating the requirements of an "enforceable" security interest), -
203(a) (indicating that a security interest "attaches" when it becomes "enforceable").
19. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 257 B.R. 157, 162 n.6 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2001) ("Under the Uniform
Commercial Code a financing statement does not need to be filed to perfect a purchase money
security interest in consumer goods."); Howell State Bank v. Jericho Boats, Inc., 533 N.YS.2d 363,
364 (Sup. Ct. 1988) ("Since the Galaxy boat was a consumer good it was unnecessary for the
plaintiff, Howell State Bank, to file a financing statement to perfect its purchase money security
interest therein.").
This rule of law is subject to one major exception. Even if the secured party claims a PMSI in a
consumer good, the security interest is not automatically perfected if the collateral is subject to a
recordation scheme imposed by statute or treaty, such as an automobile title registration statute. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-309(1), -311(a). Secured parties occasionally overlook this exception to the general rule,
often to their detriment. See, e.g., Supnik v. Key Bank of Cent. N.Y (In re Brown), 45 B.R. 766,
768-69 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985) (ruling PMSI in mobile home subject to state registration scheme
was unperfected and therefore subject to avoidance by bankruptcy trustee). Another potential pitfall
for the creditor that relies on automatic perfection is the erroneous assumption that its PMSI is in a
consumer good, when in fact the collateral is something else. See, eg, In re Rader, 144 B.R. 864,
866 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding debtor's mechanic tools were equipment, leaving unfiled
seller's PMSI unperfected and subordinate to execution lien); Hoyt v. Christoforou, 692 A.2d 217,
221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (concluding restaurant equipment was equipment, leaving unfiled seller
with unperfected PMSI "vulnerable to subordination from later, third party claims").
Given that a primary goal of perfecting a security interest is to give notice to the world of the
secured party's property interest in the collateral, one may wonder why U.C.C. Article 9 allows
automatic perfection of a PMSI in a consumer good. As explained in a leading casebook,
[tihe reasons for this exception are: (1) consumer transactions are frequently small, so the
expense of filing can significantly add to the price that the consumer will have to pay; (2)
consumer transactions are very numerous and they would unduly burden the filing
system; (3) the pre-Code rule in most states did not require filing in conditional sale
transactions; and (4) parties to consumer transactions are less likely to search the records.
ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., SECURED TRANSACIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 94 (5th ed. 2000); see
also David Gray Carlson, Purchase Money Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 IDAHO L. REv.
793 (1992/93):
[I]f every purchase money security interest in consumer goods were subject to a filing
rule, the files would be clogged with unedifying financing statements to the point where
the system might break down-and the very lives of the clerks might be at risk-under
the crush of a paper avalanche.
Id. at 795.
Although the secured party's PMSI in a consumer good may be automatically perfected on
attachment, U.C.C. Article 9 provides the secured party with an incentive to file a financing statement
anyway. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-320(b). For example, Dealer sells a piano on credit to Buyer for
personal, family, or household use. Dealer retains a PMSI that is automatically perfected on
[Vol. 40:2
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U.C.C. Article 9 also favors PMSIs in priority disputes. The general priority rule
is that a security interest is effective according to its terms not only between the
secured party and the debtor, but also against the debtor's creditors.2° But this
baseline rule is subject to other U.C.C. provisions,2 1 some of which resolve inter-
creditor priority disputes by examining the perfected status of the security interest.
22
For example, assume Bank obtains an enforceable security interest in Debtor's
equipment on February 1. A week later, Unsecured Creditor becomes a "lien
creditor" under applicable state law following a successful lawsuit and obtains a
attachment. Before the debt is repaid, Buyer sells the piano to Neighbor, also for personal, family, or
household use. If Neighbor bought the piano without knowledge of Dealer's PMSI, Neighbor
acquires the piano free of the PMSI unless Dealer filed afinancing statement. See id This example
illustrates why a secured party with a PMSI in a consumer good should take the extra step of filing a
financing statement. The filing will not affect perfection, but it does offer the creditor additional
protection against certain buyers of the collateral. Nevertheless, the priority nile of § 9-320(b), which
favors a secured party that files a financing statement, seems ill-conceived when one remembers that
the consumer rarely searches the public records for a financing statement filed against the consumer
seller before the sale of the goods is consummated. See Robert M. Lloyd, The New Article 9: Its
Impact on Tennessee Law (Part II), 67 TENN. L. REV. 329, 342-43 (2000).
20. See U.C.C. § 9-201(a).
21. Id ("Except as otherwise provided in [the Uniform Commercial Code].)
22. The secured party should perfect its security interest not only to improve its chances of
enjoying priority over other competing creditors, but also to prevent the bankruptcy trustee from
avoiding the security interest under the so-called "strong-arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2001). The strong-arm clause gives the trustee the status of a hypothetical lien
creditor as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See id. As a hypothetical lien creditor, the
trustee can invoke U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) and avoid an unperfected security interest. See, e.g., Pierce
v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. (In re Lockridge), 303 B.R 449, 457 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003); Rieser v.
Randolph County Bank (In re Masters), 137 B.R. 254, 259 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) ("Under 11
U.S.C. § 544, a trustee, on the date a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, possesses the status of a
hypothetical lien creditor. Therefore, to defeat the trustee's status, a creditor must possess a perfected
security interest on the date the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition."); Lawrence R. Ahem Ill,
"Workouts" Under RevisedArticle 9: A Review of Changes and Poposal for Study, 9 AMER. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 115, 126 (2001) (discussing the strong-arm clause); Richard L. Barnes, UCCArticle
Nine Revised: Priorities, Prefierences, and Liens Effective Only in Bankruptcy, 82 NEB. L. REV. 607,
609 (2004) (observing that 'the trustee is someone whose power is greatest against those who are
unperfected").
Even if the secured party has perfected its security interest before the debtor files its bankruptcy
petition (preventing application of the strong-arm clause), the trustee may be able to avoid the
perfected security interest under one of its other statutory powers. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). For
example, the trustee may be able to avoid a security interest that is perfected within the ninety-day
period preceding the petition date as a "preference." See id; Lockridge, 303 B.R. at 457 (observing
that security interest perfected shortly before bankruptcy petition might survive the trustee's strong-
arm challenge but still be avoided as a preference). For a preference primer, see Timothy R.
Zinnecker, Purchase-Money Security Interests in the Preference Zone: Questions Answered and
Questions Raised by the 1994 Amendments to Bankruptcy Code § 547, 62 Mo. L. REv. 47, 48-59
(1997).
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judicial lien on Debtor's equipment.23 Under the general priority rule of section 9-
201(a), Bank's property interest in Debtor's equipment should enjoy priority over the
competing lien held by Unsecured Creditor. However, section 9-317 provides an
exception to the general rule and, in most instances, awards priority to Bank only if
Bank's security interest is perfected when Unsecured Creditor's lien arises.
2 4
This result, favoring a lien creditor over an unperfected secured creditor,25 may
change if the unperfected secured creditor holds a PMSI.26 For example, assume
Dealer sells a photocopier to Debtor on June 1, while retaining an enforceable PMSI.
Dealer then delivers and installs the photocopier at Debtor's place of business on June
6 and files its financing statement on June 12. Unknown to Dealer, however, Tort
Creditor, enjoying the status of "lien creditor" under applicable law, obtained a lien on
the photocopier on June 10. Because Dealer's security interest was unperfected when
the lien arose on June 10, Tort Creditor apparently enjoys priority under section 9-
317(a)(2)(A).27 However, that general rule, governing priority disputes between lien
23. For a general discussion of how and when a party becomes a "lien creditor," defined at
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52), see 9B WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERcAL CODE SERIES
[REvART 9] § 9-317:2, at 9-270 to -277 (2002).
24. See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (awarding priority to a lien creditor whose property interest
in the collateral arises before the secured party has perfected its security interest in that collateral);
Citibank, N.A. v. Prime Motor Inns Ltd. P'ship, 780 N.E.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. 2002) (concluding, under
predecessor statute to § 9-317(a)(2)(A), that judgment creditor established its superior right to
debtor's settlement proceeds by properly levying on proceeds before secured creditor perfected his
security interest).
I say "in most instances" because even if Bank's security interest is unperfected, Unsecured
Creditor's lien may not enjoy priority if, before the lien arises, Bank has filed a financing statement
and the security agreement is in place. See id § 9-317(a)(2)(B) (protecting secured parties who have
not yet given value when the lien arises (a requirement for attachment, and therefore perfection,
under § 9-203(b)(1))).
Section 9-317 also favors certain buyers and lessees over unperfected secured parties. See id
§§ 9-317(b) (permitting eligible buyers to acquire assets free of unperfected security interests), -
317(c) (permitting eligible lessees to take goods free of unperfected security interests).
25. Some scholars question the propriety of this baseline rule that turns on the perfected
nature of the security interest. See, e.g., 9B HAWKLAND ETAL., supra note 23, § 9-317:2, at 9-268 to -
269.
Normally a lien creditor obtains only the interest the debtor had, and thus should take
subject to the prior [unperfected] security interest. A later arising interest, of course, can
prevail over a prior [unperfected] security interest if it is obtained for value and in reliance
on the prior interest not being ascertainable.
(footnotes omitted); RAYMOND T. NMMER ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACIONS: SECURED
FINANCING-CASES, MATERALS, PROBLEMS 187 (3d ed. 2003) ("More cosmically, why should a
secured creditor's priority over a lien creditor depend on whether the secured creditor gave public
notice of its interest? Notice of a security interest is typically not important to a lien creditor.")
(emphasis in original).
26. See generally 9B HAwKLAND ETAL., supra note 23, § 9-317:2, at 9-268 to -69.
27. See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A).
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creditors and secured creditors, is subject to section 9-317(e).28 Subsection (e)
awards priority to a purchase-money creditor that files its financing statement no later
than the twentieth day following delivery of the collateral to the debtor, if the
competing lien arose after attachment and before perfection.29 Dealer's filing was
timely, therefore its security interest in the photocopier enjoys priority over Tort
Creditor's lien, even though the security interest was unperfected when the lien arose,
because Dealer's security interest qualified as a PMSI.
30
Just as the general priority rule of section 9-317(a) favors a perfected secured
party over a subsequent lien creditor, so does the baseline rule for resolving priority
disputes between two perfected secured parties. 31 That general rule is codified in
section 9-322: "Conflicting perfected security interests ... rank according to priority in
time of filing or perfection." 32 For example, Bank obtains an enforceable security
interest in Debtor's accounts, equipment, and inventory in June 2003 and files its
financing statement during that month. In August 2004, Debtor borrows money fiom
Lender who obtains an enforceable security interest in Debtor's accounts, equipment,
and inventory at the time of the loan and promptly files its financing statement. In a
subsequent priority dispute between Bank and Lender concerning Debtor's accounts,
28. See id. § 9-317(a)(2) ("except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) .... ").
29. Id. § 9-317(e). The uniform version of the predecessor statute, former § 9-30 1, provided
a ten-day post-delivery filing period, which the overwhelming majority of states had extended to
twenty days. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIEs: LOCAL CODE
VARIATIONs § 9-301, pt. 3, at 1-7 (2003).
30. See U.C.C. § 9-317(e).
31. Compare id. § 9-317, with id § 9-322(a).
32. Id. § 9-322(a)(1). "The justification for [this] rule ... is that it does what the parties
would do for themselves in its absence, and thereby achieves a savings in transaction costs." Thomas
H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE
L.J. 1143, 1164 (1979); see also Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209
(1989):
The rule that secured creditors generally subordinate all subsequent creditors is said to
follow from the nature of security itself; if a debtor could dilute a security interest by
granting rights in the same property to later creditors, security interests would be rendered
worthless and no one would take them.
Id. at 216 (footnote omitted); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 1436 (1997):
The first-in-time priority granted to secured claims by the terms of Article 9 can be
explained as a cost-effective mechanism for preventing risk alterations that would
disadvantage prior creditors. The leverage over the debtor that Article 9 grants to secured
creditors is an effective bonding mechanism by which debtors offer their assets as
hostages against the commitment not to engage in further risky investments. Security also
focuses the monitoring efforts of the creditor and further reduces the agency costs of debt.
Id. at 1454-55.
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equipment, and inventory, Bank's security interest enjoys priority because Bank filed
its financing statement first.
33
U.C.C. Article 9 validates the debtor's encumbrance of yet-to-be-acquired assets
through the use of an after-acquired property clause.34 This idea of a "floating lien"
on the debtor's existing and future assets, combined with a priority rule that is
temporal, can create financial difficulty for a debtor. This difficulty is illustrated by
the following hypothetical posed by Professor Steven Schwarcz and co-author Janet
Malloy Link:
Suppose that Comer Market, a grocery store, borrowed money from National
Savings & Loan, which secured the loan with a floating lien on Comer Market's
inventory, equipment, and other assets. Comer Market then decides it could
double its profits if it buys a forklift to enable it to stock shelves more quickly. It
would like to finance the purchase of the forklift from Local Bank, which is
offering a lower interest rate than National. However, National's floating lien
has encumbered all of Comer Market's assets, and Local will not lend
33. The priority rule is not "first to file" but "first to file or perfect, whichever is earlier."
U.C.C. § 9-322(a). Without knowing when Debtor acquired rights in each account, each piece of
equipment, and each unit of inventory, the perfection date(s) of security interests claimed by Bank
and Lender cannot be determined. Nevertheless, no perfection date would precede Bank's filing date.
Therefore, the priority result would not be affected by knowing the perfection date(s).
The result remains the same-Bank's security interest enjoys priority-even if the Debtor-
Lender transaction is consummated before the Debtor-Bank transaction. For example, assume Bank
files its financing statement in June 2003, but does not obtain an enforceable security interest in
Debtor's accounts, equipment, and inventory until August 2003. Meanwhile, Debtor borrows money
in July 2003 from Lender, who obtains an enforceable security interest in Debtor's accounts,
equipment, and inventory at the time of the loan and promptly files its financing statement. In a
subsequent priority dispute between Bank and Lender concerning Debtor's accounts, equipment, and
inventory, Bank's security interest enjoys priority because Bank filed its financing statement first,
even though Lender's security interest was perfected first. See id § 9-322, cmt. 4, ex. 1. "The
justification for determining priority by order of filing lies in the necessity of protecting the filing
system-that is, of allowing the first secured party who has filed to make subsequent advances
without each time having to check for subsequent filings as a condition of protection." Id
Presumably, Lender will review the public records before funding its loan and discover Bank's earlier
filing. Lender then can decide to take one of the following courses of action: (1) do not make the
loan, (2) obtain a security interest in unencumbered collateral, (3) seek a subordination agreement
from Bank, and (4) make an unsecured loan at a higher interest rate. Jackson & Kronman, supra
note 32, at 1178.
34. See U.C.C. § 9-204(a); see also Jackson & Kronman, supra note 32, at 1166-67
(explaining why "a legal regime that recognizes the validity of after-acquired property clauses is
more efficient than one that does not").
For an article that examines the development of the idea of encumbering after-acquired
property, see generally David Cohen & Albert B. Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U.
PA. L. REV. 635 (1939).
[Vol. 40:2
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unsecured. Thus, National's floating lien creates a situational monopoly because
Comer Market has no collateral to offer as security to other lenders.35
Professor Schwarcz and co-author Link then explain why the law should not permit
this "situational monopoly" to remain:
Unrestrained situational monopolies are economically inefficient because they
eliminate competition. They allow the lender who executes a floating lien to
extract monopoly profits by charging above competitive rates on subsequent
loans, or to impose the lender's judgment on the debtor by withholding (and
therefore depriving the debtor of) new capital.36
U.C.C. Article 9 has created a financing mechanism that comes to the debtor's
rescue and breaks the chains of this situational monopoly by creating a major
exception to the basic priority rule.37 This exception creates a "second in time but
first in line" rule by bestowing "super-priority" on selected PMSI holders." The
35. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Janet Malloy Link, Protecting Rights, Preventing Windfalls:
A Model for Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens, 75 N.C. L. REV. 403, 426
(1997).
36. Id.
37. Seeid. at 427.
38. Id ("The PMSI defeats the situational monopoly by giving debtors the opportunity to
acquire new collateral at competitive interest rates and creditors the opportunity to extend purchase
money financing on a secured basis."); see also MBank Alamo Nat'l Ass'n v. Raytheon Co., 886
E2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1989):
PMSIs provide an avenue for heavily burdened debtors to obtain credit for specific goods
when creditors who have previously loaned money to the debtor may be unwilling to
advance additional funds.... By giving a PMSI holder a priority interest in the specific
goods purchased, there is some incentive for a lender to advance funds or credit for the
specific transaction.
Id at 1452 (intemal citation omitted); id at 1460 (Goldberg, J., dissenting):
Creditors who have previously loaned money to the debtor and taken a security interest in
the debtor's goods may be unwilling to advance additional value or fimds.... The
purchase money security provisions thus enable a leveraged debtor who is able to find a
new lender to give that new lender a first claim on the new collateral purchased
notwithstanding a prior filing by another creditor.
(footnotes omitted); Jackson & Kronman, supra note 32, at 1167 ("In our view, the purchase money
priority is best thought of as a device for alleviating the situational monopoly created by an after-
acquired property clause."); Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994):
Relational theory offers two explanations to justify the PMSI super-priority... The
PMSI... allows the debtor to develop projects on its own that the general creditor would
probably veto. Second, purchase money lenders presumably have specialized skills in
monitoring and policing inventory and equipment that the general financer lacks. Thus,
the skills of the PMSI creditor complement those of the general financer, and may serve to
reduce monitoring costs.
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exception is codified in section 9-324, with arguably the most significant rules found
in subsections (a) and (b).39
Subsection (b) awards super-priority to the holder of a PMSI in inventory 40 if (i)
the secured party perfected its PMSI by the time the debtor received possession of the
inventory,41 (ii) the "secured party sen[t] an authenticated [notice] to the holder of the
conflicting security interest, ' 42 (iii) the holder of the conflicting security interest
Id. at 1798 (footnotes omitted); Scott, supra note 32, at 1455:
Fully protected by the hostage of security, creditors are motivated to be excessively
cautious in refusing to permit subsequent financing that would enhance total returns to the
firm. Thus, the first-in-time rule must be tempered with a scheme of superpriorities that
offer the debtor an escape hatch to guard against creditor myopia. Hence, purchase money
security interests and subsequent purchasers of chattel paper are granted priority over
prior-in-time secured creditors as a means of balancing the effects of using assets as
hostages.
But support for purchase-money priority is not unanimous. See, e.g., E H. Buckley, The
Bankruptcy Priority Puzze, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1461-69 (1986) (concluding that none of the
justifications offered for purchase-money priority "makes a convincing case"); Schwartz, supra note
32, at 252-54 (viewing purchase-money priority as "questionable"); James J. White, Reforming
Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing Rules, 79 MINN. L. REV. 529, 560-63
(1995) (noting several weaknesses of the justifications offered for purchase-money priority,
expressing doubts about the fairness and efficiency of purchase-money priority, and concluding he
"would not shed a tear over the abolition" of purchase-money priority).
39. See U.C.C. § 9-324(a)-(b). Subsections (d) and (e) address purchase-money priority in
livestock (a term not defined by U.C.C. Article 9) that are "farm products" (defined at U.C.C. § 9-
102(a)(34)). Id § 9-324(d)-(e). Subsection (f) addresses purchase-money priority in "software"
(defined at U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(75)). Id at § 9-324(o. Subsection (g) provides rules that resolve
priority disputes when the collateral is subject to multiple PMSIs, which might occur, for example,
when Dealer sells equipment on credit to Buyer, who pays the required down payment with funds
advanced by Lender. Id. § 9-3 24(g).
40. Super-priority in the inventory also extends to some, but not all, proceeds. See U.C.C. §
9-324(b) (extending super-priority to selected chattel paper, selected instruments, and identifiable
cash proceeds received by the debtor no later than when the debtor delivers the inventory to a buyer).
The super-priority does not extend to proceeds in the nature of accounts, for reasons explained in § 9-
324, cmt. 8.
41. U.C.C. § 9-324(bX l); see Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Banque Lavoro S.A., 852 F Supp.
1235, 1241 & n.ll (S.D.N.Y 1994) (ruling creditor that perfected its PMSI in coffee in November
could not claim super-priority over earlier creditor because debtor had possession of coffee at least as
early as October); Rushville Nat'l Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Dupont Feed Mill Corp.), 121
B.R 555, 561 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding creditor that filed financing statement with county
clerk, rather than central filing officer, was not perfected when debtor received fertilizer; therefore,
creditor could not claim super-priority over pre-existing creditor).
42. § 9-324(b)(2). Normally this situation arises when a creditor claims a security interest in
the inventory through its after-acquired property clause. See Davis Bros., Inc. v. United Bank of
Littleton, 701 P.2d 642, 644 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding creditor's PMSI in debtor's drugs and
sundries was ineligible for super-priority because creditor never gave notice of its PMSI to earlier
creditor); Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Blueville Bank of Grafton, 438 S.E.2d 817, 822-25
(W. Va. 1993) (holding purchase-money creditor that failed to send notice of its security interest to
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received the notice sometime within the five-year period preceding the debtor's
possession of the inventory,43 and (iv) the notice stated that the purchase-money
creditor is claiming a PMSI in the inventory described in the notice.
44
Subsection (a), which applies when the collateral is not inventory (e.g.,
45
equipment), is much less rigorous. The statute imposes only one requirement on
the purchase-money creditor seeking super-priority: the PMSI must be perfected
"when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within 20 days thereafter.
'46
Unlike the inventory creditor, the non-inventory creditor is neither required to perfect
its security interest before the debtor takes possession of the collateral nor is it
obligated to give notice of its PMSI to any other creditor, including existing creditors
who otherwise enjoy priority from an earlier filing and an after-acquired property
clause.47
competing creditor did not enjoy super-priority).
The creditors to whom notice must be sent are described in U.C.C. § 9-324(c).
43. U.C.C. § 9-324(bX3). The statute's reference to a five-year period may be confusing to
the casual reader. The statute merely tells the creditor that the notice is good for five years. See id at
cmt. 5. The creditor is not required to continuously send the same notice if it continues to sell or
finance the debtor's inventory purchases. See id.
44. U.C.C. § 9-324(b)(4); see Fedders Fin. Corp. v. Chiarelli Bros., Inc., 289 A.2d 169, 172
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (ruling that creditor's failure to describe air conditioners by serial number was
not fatal to claim of super-priority).
45. See U.C.C. § 9-324(a). U.C.C. § 9-324(a) is also inapplicable to livestock, the purchase-
money priority of which is addressed in subsection (d).
46. U.C.C. § 9-324(a). The uniform version of the predecessor statute, former § 9-312(4),
provided a ten-day post-delivery filing period, which the overwhelming majority of states had
extended to twenty days. See HAwKLAND, supra note 29, at 81-93.
The policy for providing the brief post-delivery grace period for filing is out of deference to the
creditor's
business practice of filing after delivery in cases of purchase money security interests in
collateral other than inventory. Thus, if the debtor insists that he must have the goods
today, the purchase-money financer can deliver them, without sacrificing his §9-312(4)
[§9-324(a)] priority, provided he perfects within the following 10 [20] days.
2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURrIY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 29.5, at 799-800 (1965) (footnote
omitted).
47. Professors White and Summers explain the justification for placing a more onerous
burden on the inventory financer as follows:
In inventory finance, the general "revolving loan" or "line of credit", is common and the
debtor comes to the original inventory financer periodically asking for new extensions and
offering new collateral. It was feared that an unscrupulous debtor might take advantage of
the ignorance of his original inventory financer by procuring a secured loan against new
inventory from the original financer when he had already granted a purchase money
security interest in that inventory to such other creditor. The obligation of such other
creditor to notify earlier creditors of purchase money security interests on inventory makes
that kind of fraud difficult. On the other hand, the practice with respect to equipment is for
the secured creditor to make a single loan against a single piece of equipment and for the
2004/05]
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The application of this super-priority rule was at the heart of the analysis in In re
Alphatech Systems, Inc., a case recently decided by a three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.48 The case is summarized in Part
I.
HI. THE ALPHATECH SYSTEMS OPINION
In September 1998, United Financial Group, Inc. ("United"), agreed to extend
credit to Alphatech Systems, Inc. ("Alphatech"), secured by "a blanket security
interest in 'any and all goods, accounts receivable, chattels, fixtures, furniture,
equipment, assets and property of every kind wherever, now and/or hereafter
belonging to Alphatech .... - United filed its financing statement with the Florida
Secretary of State on September 16, 1998.50
In late December, Methods Machine Tools, Inc. ("Methods Machine"), sold a
lathe to Alphatech.51 The December 29th invoice obligated Alphatech to pay
$247,063 within thirty days; Methods Machine delivered the lathe on December 31,
1998.52
Alphatech did not have financing in place at the time of the sale, but on February
17, 1999, it reached an agreement with Textron Financial Corporation ("Textron") to
finance the purchase in exchange for a security interest in the lathe.5 3 Textron filed its
loan to be paid down without additional related extensions of credit.
4 JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORRM CoMMERciAL CODE § 33-4, at 291-92 (5th ed.
[Practitioner's Edition] 2002); see also U.C.C. § 9-324, cmt. 4. But see Douglas G Baird & Thomas
H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope ofArticle 9, 35 STAN. L. REV.
175, 195-96 (1983) (advocating a notice requirement as a predicate to non-inventory super-priority in
order "to cure the ostensible ownership problems" faced by the earlier secured party). Authors of a
leading casebook question the merits of the Baird-Jackson position, observing: "Although they base
their argument on ostensible ownership grounds, they fail to address the empirical question of
whether secured creditors typically are aware of debtors' possession of after-acquired equipment."
JOHN O. HONNOLDETAL., SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 245 (3d ed. 2001).
48. Textron Fin. Corp. v. United Fin. Group, Inc. (In re Alphatech Sys., Inc.), 317 F.3d 1267,
1269 (llth Cir. 2003).
49. Id. at 1268 (quoting the agreement between Alphatech and United).
50. Id
51. Id. The Methods Machine web site describes itself as "a solution-oriented machine tool
sales and service organization . .. [that] help[s] machine shops and manufacturing facilities stay
ahead of their competition with the latest in metalworking technology and equipment." Methods
Machine Tools, Inc., at http://www.methodsmachine.com/index.htnil (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
The opinion describes the lathe as "a Nakamura TW 10-4 Multi Axis Lathe." Textron Fin., 317 F.3d
at 1268.
52. Textron Fin., 317 F.3d at 1268.
53. Id. By this date Methods Machine had issued a second invoice dated January 20, 1999.
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financing statement with the Florida Secretary of State a few days earlier on February
12, 1999.1
4
Sometime later, Alphatech went into bankruptcy,55 and thereafter a dispute arose
between United and Textron as to whose perfected security interest in the lathe
enjoyed priority.56 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court held that Textron's
perfected PMSI did not have super-priority under Florida's version of former U.C.C.
section 9-312(4), the forerunner of revised section 9-324(a), because Textron had not
filed its financing statement by the fifteenth day following Methods Machine's
delivery of the lathe to Alphatech on December 31.57 Textron appealed.5 8
The appellate panel identified the "sole issue on appeal" as "whether Textron had
a properly perfected purchase money security interest in the Lathe, and thus had a
priority to United's perfected security interest" under Florida's version of U.C.C.
Article 9.59 The panel observed that it was "clear ... that Textron perfected its
purchase money security interest 43 days after delivery of the Lathe" by its filing on
February 12, 1999.60 Textron argued that Alphatech did not become a "debtor" until
it executed the Alphatech-Textron security agreement on February 17 and therefore,
the fifteen-day filing period did not commence until February 17, the first date on
which Alphatech had possession as a debtor.6 1 The appellate panel disagreed.62
This Court finds Textron's argument unpersuasive, and extremely susceptible to
manipulation by debtors and creditors. Under Textron's reasoning, a purchase
money security interest creditor could gain priority over a prior perfected
security interest at any time after delivery of the collateral so long as the
financing was agreed to within the fifteen days prior to the filing of the UCC-1
financing statement.
54. Id. Both the revised and former versions of U.C.C. Article 9 permit a secured creditor to
file its financing statement before the parties execute the security agreement or the security interest
otherwise becomes enforceable. See U.C.C. § 9-502(d) (2004); former U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
55. The appellate opinion does not state when Alphatech went into bankruptcy. Presumably,
Alphatech (or its creditors) filed the bankniptcy petition several weeks, if not months, before
February 9, 2001-the date the bankruptcy court issued its judgment on priority in favor of United
and against Textron. See Textron Fin., 317 F.3d at 1268.
56. Id
57. Id. As noted earlier, the uniform version of former U.C.C. § 9-312(4) awarded super-
priority to the purchase-money creditor if the PMSI was perfected no later than ten days after
delivery of the asset, a period that most states had extended to twenty days. See supra note 46;
Florida's non-uniform amendment extended the filing deadline to fifteen days. See Textron Fin., 317
E3d at 1269 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.312(4) (West 1999) (repealed 2001) (Florida's version of
former U.C.C. § 9-312(4))).
58. Textron Fin., 317 E3d at 1269.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id.
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The language of [Florida's version of former section 9-312(4)] is clear.
Alphatech was a debtor no later than December 31, 1998, when the Lathe was
delivered to Alphatech from Method Machines [sic] on net thirty-day terms.
Therefore, Textron had fifteen days from December 31, 1998, to properly
perfect its purchase money security interest. Since Textron did not perfect until
43 days later on February 12, 1999, Textron did not gain priority over United's
prior perfected security interest.
63
The panel then affirmed the district court's order, awarding priority to United.64
IV. THE (NON)PURCHASE-MONEY STATUS OF TEXTRON'S SECURITY INITEREST
The appellate panel's decision to award priority to United, rather than Textron,
rested on its conclusion that Textron was not entitled to super-priority because it
failed to timely perfect its PMSI in the lathe. 65 Nowhere in its opinion, however, did
the panel address whether Textron even had a PMSI. 66 A review of the financial
arrangements surrounding Alphatech's acquisition of the lathe should have led the
panel to conclude that Textron was ineligible for super-priority, not because Textron
made an untimely filing, but rather because its security interest did not qualify for
purchase-money status.
Textron did not engage in seller-financing, so its security interest would only
enjoy purchase-money status if it gave the value that Alphatech used to acquire rights
in the lathe. 67 Textron certainly gave value to Alphatech by agreeing to loan funds
which Alphatech used to pay Methods Machine for the lathe. However, Textron
made its loan on February 17, 1999, nearly one and a half months after Alphatech had
purchased the lathe on December 29, 1998.69 Alphatech acquired its property rights
in the lathe on the purchase date, or two days later upon delivery; Alphatech did not
acquire any additional property rights in the lathe when it used Textron's loan
proceeds in February 1999 to pay the sales invoice issued by Methods Machine. As
Textron's credit extension did not permit Alphatech to acquire any additional property
rights in the lathe, Textron's security interest was not a PMSI.70 Therefore, Textron's
63. Textron Fin., 317 F.3d at 1269.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. Cf id at 1268-69.
67. U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b)(1); former U.C.C. § 9-107.
68. Textron Fin., 317 F.3d at 1268.
69. Id.
70. Compare Textron Fin., 317 F.3d at 1268, with U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b)(1), and former
U.C.C. § 9-107.
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security interest was ineligible for super-priority, so United's security interest enjoyed
priority under the general first-to-file-or-perfect rule.
7 1
A case that supports this analysis is North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit
Association of North Platte.72 Long (seller) and Tucker (buyer) made an oral contract
in November 1968 for the sale of cattle, which were later identified to the contract
and then delivered to Tucker on November 30, 1968.73 Based on the understanding
of the parties and applicable provisions of U.C.C. Article 2, the court concluded that
(i) title to the seventy-nine cows passed to Tucker at delivery and (ii) Long was
making the sale on open and unsecured credit.
74
In November and December of 1968, Tucker visited North Platte State Bank (the
"Bank") to discuss opening a line of credit, but the parties did not discuss a specific
loan for any particular purpose.75 On January 13, 1969, Tucker drew a $17,775
check on the Bank and delivered it to Long as payment for the cattle. 76 Long then
mailed the check to the Bank for payment, but the Bank returned the check because
Tucker's account had insufficient funds. 7 After Long contacted the Bank to discuss
payment of the check, the Bank acknowledged the previous loan discussions with
Tucker and told the parties that a $20,000 loan would be granted, and the Bank would
honor the check if Tucker would come in and complete the necessary paperwork.78
Inclement weather prevented Tucker from executing the paperwork, which included a
security agreement covering the sevety-nine cows, until January 30, 1969. 79 The
Bank honored the $17,775 check the next day and filed a financing statement on
February 5, 1969.80
In December 1969, a priority dispute erupted between the Bank and an earlier
creditor.81 Production Credit Association of North Platte, which through an after-
acquired property clause and a financing statement filed in August of 1967, claimed
priority as the first creditor to file and perfect a security interest in the cattle.82 The
district court agreed.83 On appeal, the Bank argued that its security interest was a
PMSI entitled to super-priority under former section 9-312(4). 4 The court held that
71. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1); former U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
72. 200 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Neb. 1972).
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id at5.
75. Id. at3.
76. Id.
77. See N. Platte State Bank, 200 N.W.2d at 3.
78. Id
79. Id.
80. Id
81. Id at4.
82. N. Platte State Bank, 200 N.W.2d at 3-4.
83. Id at4.
84. Id.
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the Bank was not entitled to any super-priority because the Bank did not have a
PMSI.
85
As we have pointed out, section 9-107(b), U.C.C., provides that a security
interest cannot become a purchase money security interest unless it is taken by a
person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so
used. Clearly, the Bank could not qualify as the seller of the 79 cows.
Obviously, by advancing the $20,000 and taking the mortgage it did acquire a
security interest in the cows. The distinction is vital to the disposition of this
case. The money advanced by the Bank enabled Tucker to pay the price to
Seller for the cows. But it was not used by Tucker to acquire any rights in the
cows because he already had all the possible rights in the cows he could have
with both possession and title.86
Just as the Bank in North Platte State Bank did not have a PMSI in the cows that
Tucker acquired prior to the loan, Textron did not have a PMSI in the lathe that
Alphatech acquired forty-five days prior to the loan. 87  In both cases, third-party
financing came too late to enable the debtor to acquire any additional rights in the
asset previously purchased 8
85. Id at 5-6.
86. Id. at 6. The court also held that the Bank would not have been entitled to any super-
priority because the Bank had failed to timely file its financing statement as required by former § 9-
312(4). Id. The court acknowledged that the Bank filed its financing statement within ten days after
making the loan but more than two months after Tucker had taken possession of the cattle. Id at 6.
This part of the court's opinion is discussed infra at Part V.
87. Compare N. Platte State Bank, 200 N.W.2d at 5-6, with Textron Fin. Corp. v. United Fin.
Group, Inc. (In re Alphatech Sys., Inc.), 317 F.3d 1267, 1268 (11 th Cir. 2003).
88. Textron Fin., 317 F.3d at 1268; N. Platte State Bank, 200 N.W.2d at 5-6. For other cases
similar to North Platte State Bank, see In re Cliff's Ridge Skiing Corp., 123 B.R. 753, 763-64 (Bankr.
WD. Mich. 1991) (holding that two advances by bank to debtor in December of 1982 did not give
bank a PMSI in chairlift acquired by debtor on cash-on-delivery basis and delivered in August of
1982, "[b]ecause delivery of the chairlift occurred approximately four months before First National
made any loan advance, the court concludes the value given by First National did not 'enable' the
Debtor to acquire the chairlift"); Manuel v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Manuel), 18 B.R 403,404-
05 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981) (holding that finance company that advanced checks in March 1979 made
payable to both debtor and co-payees for payment of furniture purchases on open account made in
September 1977, February 1978, September 1978, and on an unstated date before the finance
company's loan, could not claim a PMSI in those furnishings that secured repayment of its credit
extensions.
Since the plaintiffs already had possession of the household goods and furnishings on
March 2, 1979, when the security agreement was executed and when Blazer advanced the
funds, it is clear that Blazer made no advances nor incurred any obligation which enabled
'the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral'.. . [and] therefore, Blazer does not have a
purchase-money security interest.
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The foregoing analysis does not necessarily dictate the conclusion that a security
interest claimed by a non-seller creditor can never enjoy purchase-money status if the
debtor's acquisition of the asset precedes the non-seller's credit extension. A case that
illustrates this point is General Electric Capital Commercial Automotive Finance,
Inc. v. Spartan Motors, Ltd.89
General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") agreed to finance the
vehicle inventory of Spartan Motors (a car dealership) in July 1991.90 On May 7,
1992, Spartan Motors used its own money in the amount of $121,500 to purchase a
1992 Mercedes Benz 600 SEL from European Auto Wholesalers, Ltd.; GMAC
reimbursed Spartan on May 13, 1992.91 On July 7, 1992, Spartan again used its own
money, this time $120,000, to purchase another 1992 Mercedes Benz 600 SEL from
(quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-107(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976))); In re Brooks, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
660, 661-64 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (concluding that credit union's security interest in debtor's
household furnishings, created by security agreement executed in June of 1975, was not a purchase-
money security interest because debtor had purchased the household funishings in December of
1974, at least in part by unsecured loans funded at that time by credit union; at the time of the June
1975 security agreement, "the credit union made no 'advances... to enable the debtor[s] to acquire
rights in [or the use] of the collateral' as is required of one who is not a seller in order to qualify for a
purchase money security interest') (quoting former U.C.C. § 9-107(2)); Valley Bank v. Estate of
Rainsdon, 793 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the bank did not have PMSI in
cows purchased by debtors in 1982 as result of loan payment funded by bank in March of 1983; the
court stated that "[h]ere as in North Platte State Bank, the money advanced by the bank was not used
by the debtor (Robert) to acquire any rights in the cows or the use of them because he already had all
the possible rights in the cows he could have"); M Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Union Bank & Trust
Co., 528 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a debtor's use of a bank's money to
make payments to finance creditor that had been paying motorcycle seller's invoices did not give
bank a PMSI in the motorcycles; "The Bank did not give value to Gresham so he could acquire
rights in the collateral. Gresham had already acquired rights in the motorcycles when he obtained
money from the Bank. The money obtained from the Bank was not 'in fact... used' to 'acquire
[the] rights."') (quoting IND. CODE § 26-1-9-107(b) (2002)); Wade Credit Corp. v. Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp., 732 P.2d 76, 77-79 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that BWAC's advancement of
funds to debtor, who then remitted funds to seller as payment for tractors, did not create PMSI in
favor of BWAC. Debtor acquired title to, and took delivery of, first tractor on October 7, 1980, and
BWAC advanced funds several days later. Debtor acquired title to, and took delivery of, second
tractor on January 13, 1981; and BWAC advanced funds on June 17, 1981.
[A]s in North Platte, the debtor already had acquired both title to and possession of the
collateral before defendant advanced it money to pay for the tractors. In other words, the
money that defendant advanced did not enable the debtor to acquire any use of or interest
in the tractors that it did not have already. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant does
not have a purchase money security interest in the tractors.
(footnotes omitted)).
89. See Gen. Elec. Capital Commercial Auto. Fin., Inc. v. Spartan Motors, Ltd., 675
N.YS.2d 626, 632-33 (N.Y App. Div. 1998).
90. Id. at 629.
91. Id. at 630.
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the same seller; GMAC reimbursed Spartan on July 9, 1992.92 Later that year
Spartan Motors filed a bankruptcy petition.93 A priority dispute for the two Mercedes
Benz vehicles arose between GMAC and General Electric Capital Commercial
Automotive Finance ("GECC"), an earlier inventory financer.94  The trial court
granted GECC's motion for summary judgment after noting that GMAC's contract
obligated it to pay funds directly to sellers in advance of the sale, and only to that
extent could GMAC claim a PMSI.95 Because GMAC had reimbursed the debtor,
Spartan Motors, rather than making direct payment to the seller, European Auto
Wholesalers, GMAC did not posess a PMSI in the two vehicles.96  Therefore,
GECC's security interest enjoyed priority.97
The New York Supreme Court reversed, awarding priority to GMAC and
98granting its motion for summary judgment. The supreme court first observed, as
explained by U.C.C. Article 9 architect Grant Gilmore, that U.C.C. section 9-107(b),
the enabling loan prong of the PMSI definition under former U.C.C. Article 9, had
been enacted "to liberalize the rather rigid traditional rules" that addressed the
situations under which a PMSI could be claimed by a non-seller financer who
enabled the debtor to acquire inventory.99 Rather than exclusively focusing on "the
chronology of the financing" or "the configuration of the cash flow," the court
believed that proper analysis required a determination of whether the loan transaction
was "closely allied" to the purchase transaction. 00 The court observed that temporal
proximity of the credit extension to the asset acquisition, as well as the intent of the
parties, were two important factors in determining the "close alliance."' 1 Because (i)
GMAC made payments to Spartan Motors within only two and six days following
the purchases, (ii) GMAC's post-purchase reimbursement was a common industry
practice, and routine with Spartan Motors, (iii) GMAC was contractually obligated to
give value to enable Spartan Motors to acquire its vehicle inventory, and (iv) the
value given by GMAC enabled Spartan Motors to purchase the two expensive
92. Id
93. Id. at 630.
94. Spartan Motors, 675 N.YS.2d at 629-30.
95. Id at 630.
96. Id
97. Id.
98. Id at 630.
99. Spartan Motors, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 631; see also Grant Gilmore, The Purchase Money
Priority, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1333, 1374 (1963) ("The evident intent of [former U.C.C. § 9-107(b)] ...
is to free the purchase money concept from artificial limitations; rigid adherence to particular
formalities and sequences should not be required."). Professor Gilmore echoes this statement in his
acclaimed treatise on secured credit. 2 GILMoRE, supra note 46, § 29.2, at 782.
100. Spartan Motors, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32.
101. ld.at632.
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vehicles, the court concluded that the loans were "closely allied" to the two
acquisitions, thereby giving GMAC a PMSI.
10 2
The supreme court did not reach a contrary result solely because Spartan Motors
took title to the cars before GMAC extended credit. While the chronology of events
might suggest that the loan merely satisfied a pre-existing debt, rather than enabling
Spartan Motors to acquire rights in the two cars,
it seems ill-advised to create an artificial rule premised upon this circumstance,
as there will be cases where a purchase money arrangement will not be
established even though title has not passed, and other cases, like the one before
us, where the passing of title is irrelevant to the creditor's demonstration that the
value he extended was closely allied to the purchase of the collateral.
10 3
Nor did the supreme court hold that North Platte State Bank dictated a contrary
result. 10 4 Rather, the court distinguished the earlier case by noting that the purchase
and loan transactions were nearly two months apart, unlike two and six days
respectively. Furthermore, the debtor and creditor had not negotiated credit terms
before the debtor bought the cattle, and the creditor was not obligated to extend credit
to enable the debtor to buy the them.'0 ' "Put somewhat differently, in North Platte
the availability of the loan was not a factor in the debtor's negotiation of the sale; and
the plaintiff bank was not committed at the time of the sale to advance the amount
required to pay for the items purchased."'
0 6
102. Id.
103. Id. at 633. As between the secured party and the debtor, title to the collateral generally is
immaterial under U.C.C. Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-202 (2004); former U.C.C. § 9-202.
104. See Spartan Motors, 675 N.YS.2d at 633.
105. 1d
106. Id.
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Spartan Motors and other cases' 0 7 illustrate that a non-seller creditor may
successfully claim that its security interest is eligible for purchase-money status, even
if it extends credit after the debtor has acquired the asset, if the credit extension and
the asset acquisition are "closely allied."' 0 8 Strong evidence of this close alliance is
107. See, e.g., Hunter v. McHemy, 71 B.R. 60, 62-64 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (concluding
that debtor's possession of vehicle on or about March 14 did not prevent credit union from claiming
PMSI in vehicle after issuing its check for the purchase price on March 27, to seller's courier, in
return for vehicle's certificate of title issued on March 25);
A review of the entire case suggests that the transaction involved all three parties, and that
the resulting circumstances were part of their effort to consummate a sale of the vehicle.
In light of these facts, it must be concluded that the value extended by [the credit union]
was intended to, and did in fact, enable the Debtor to acquire the car, regardless of whether
or not she already had possession.
United States v. Hooks (In re Hooks), 40 B.R. 715, 720-21 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that
lender had PMSI in cattle, title to which, pursuant to agreement, did not pass from seller to debtor
until January 18, when debtor executed promissory note and security agreement, even though debtor
possessed cattle for several weeks earlier and lender did not disburse funds to seller until January 29;
debtor's earlier possession was solely to permit debtor to inspect and milk cows and determine
whether he wished to purchase them, and title did not pass during this time; delay between loan
agreement and funding did not prevent creation of PMSI, as the loan and the disbursement were
"closely allied to the sale"); Corim, Inc. v. Belvin, 414 S.E.2d 491, 491-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), rev 'd
on other grounds sub nom. Crossroads Bank of Georgia v. Corim, Inc., 418 S.E.2d 601 (1992)
(holding that bank which funded purchase price of cotton picker on February 7 held a PMSI, even
though debtor acquired the cotton picker at auction on January 28; debtor and bank president had
agreed several days prior to the auction that bank would finance the purchase if debtor was successful
bidder, terms of the loan were finalized after the auction was held and the amount of the winning bid
was known).
[T]he loan enabled [the debtor] to purchase the cotton picker and although there were a
number of days between the purchase and the finalization of the loan, the purchase and the
loan were sufficiently 'closely allied' to create a purchase money security interest ....
The evidence is uncontroverted that steps taken by [the debtor] and [the bank] before and
after the auction were parts of'a single financing arrangement' which enabled [the debtor]
to acquire fights in the cotton picker ....
De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223, 1224-27 (I. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that bank which
advanced loan proceeds used by debtors to pay seller of cattle, previously ordered by debtor and
received on September 15 and 16, had PMSI in cattle, even though bank advanced loan proceeds on
September 30; the court held so notwithstanding competing creditor's contention that loan proceeds
did not permit debtors to acquire any rights in the cattle but merely satisfied pre-existing debt).
The case at bar is distinguishable from North Platte in that the cattle were not purchased
on open account. Unlike in North Platte, title did not pass upon transfer of possession. It
is clear that the terms of the sale to the Purdys were such that title did not pass to the
Purdys until Saunders received payment.... We disagree with De Kalb's contention that
the Purdys already possessed all possible rights in the cattle. Title is obviously a tight in
property, and the funds provided by Shabbona enabled the Purdys to acquire this right.
108. Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 9-103 states in part:
The concept of "purchase-money security interest" requires a close nexus between the
acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation. Thus, a security interest does not
[Vol. 40:2
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present if the debtor, the secured party, and the seller understand on the purchase date
that the debtor will be relying on the secured party's financing to pay the purchase
price. In this situation, the financing creditor's security interest should be deemed a
PMSI because the assurance and expectation of the forthcoming financing enables
the debtor to acquire rights in the asset. Absent such evidence-for example, a
debtor seeks third-party financing after acquiring the asset from a seller who views
the transaction as a standard unsecured sale--the financer's security interest should
not be treated as a PMSI because the financing did not enable the debtor to acquire
any rights in the asset.10 9
Unfortunately, the reported facts of Alphatech do not permit the Eleventh Circuit
in Textron to rely on Spartan Motors and its "close alliance" test in its pursuit of
Textron's PMSI. Alphatech bought the lathe on December 29, 1998; Methods
qualify as a purchase-money security interest if a debtor acquires property on unsecured
credit and subsequently creates the security interest to secure the purchase price.
U.C.C. § 9-103, cmt. 3 (2004). Authors of a leading ireatise rely on the Official Comment to
conclude that the validity of cases like Spartan Motors "is unclear, but doubtful." See 9A
HAWKLAND, supra note 29, § 9-103:3, at 9-249 to -251. If the Official Comment is taken literally,
then the timing of both the purchase and the credit extension becomes of paramount importance. See
id § 9-103:3, at 9-249. This elevates form over substance, emphasizing the "artificial limitations"
and "particular formalities and sequences" that Grant Gilmore discouraged, while leaving no room to
accommodate the structural nuances of the transaction, or the understanding and expectations of the
seller, the debtor-buyer, and the creditor-financer. Gilmore, supra note 99, at 1374; see, e.g, Spartan
Motors, 675 N.YS.2d at 633 (noting the flexibility of secured transactions). Granting PMSI status, in
appropriate circumstances, to a financer that extends credit after the debtor has acquired the collateral
would not render the quoted passage from the Official Comment meaningless. The passage would
continue to thwart a merchant from claiming a PMSI after it converts an unsecured credit sale into a
secured credit sale some time after the purchase date, in response to the buyer-debtor's financial
woes.
Given the number of cases that have addressed PMSI eligibility by reviewing the close alliance
between the asset acquisition and the subsequent credit extension, it is rather puzzling why the
drafters of revised U.C.C. Article 9 elected to address this significant issue with a single reference to
an undefined "close nexus" in the official comments, rather than with more specific statutory
language and additional elaboration and guidance in the official comments. At one time the initial
drafters considered giving purchase-money status to a security interest
taken by a person who for the purpose of enabling the debtor to pay for or acquire rights in
or the use of collateral makes advances or incurs an obligation not more than ten days
before or after the debtor receives possession of the collateral even though the value given
is not in fact used to pay the price.
27 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRATS 202 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984). The official
comment explained that the purpose of this "conclusive presumption" of purchase-money status was
"[t]o eliminate difficulties of tracing." Id. This provision did not survive the drafting process and
was "deleted for the reason that it extends the purchase money security interest concept too far." 28
id at 285-86 (1984).
109. See 8 HAWKLAND ETAL., supra note 29, §§ 9-107:3, 9-540 to -542 (discussing enabling
loans under former U.C.C. Article 9); 9A HAWKLAND ETAL., supra note 29, § 9-103:3, at 9-249 to -
251 (2001) (discussing enabling loans under revised U.C.C. Article 9).
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Machine delivered the lathe two days later, when "Alphatech did not [yet] have
financing in place."' 10 If Alphatech did not have any financing in place, it would be
difficult to conclude that Methods Machine's willingness to sell the lathe on
unsecured credit hinged on its expectation or understanding that Alphatech intended
to fund the purchase price with imminent third-party financing. 111 Absent any
evidence of that expectation or understanding, Textron's February loan did not enable
Alphatech to acquire any rights in the lathe that it did not already hold as of the
December 31 delivery date.' 2 The sales transaction and the loan extension were not
"closely allied," so Textron cannot claim that its security interest in the lathe is a
PMSI.
In summary, the appellate panel should have concluded that Textron did not have
a PMSI in the lathe. 1 3 That conclusion would have permitted the panel to avoid
addressing the timeliness of Textron's filing under the super-priority statute. 114
110. See generally Textron Fin. Corp. v. United Fin. Group (In re Alphatech Sys., Inc.), 317
E3d 1267, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2003).
111. Although Textron did not agree to make the loan until February 17, the case reveals that
"Alphatech arranged for Textron to finance the purchase of the Lathe" before Methods Machine
issued a second invoice on January 20. Id. The case does not (i) explain the delay in making the
loan, (ii) indicate when Alphatech first approached Textron or any other lender, or (iii) suggest when
Alphatech initially disclosed to Methods Machine that it might use third-party financing to pay for
the lathe. Evidence on these matters may have aided Textron in carrying out its burden of proving
that its security interest in the lathe was a PMSI if the appellate panel had addressed the purchase-
money nature of the security interest.
112. Although the case does not expressly state that Methods Machine sold the lathe to
Alphatech on unsecured credit, the terms of the purchase price, payable in-full within thirty days,
combined with the omission of any suggestion of a secured credit sale, support that conclusion. See
id at 1268-69. If Methods Machine had sold the lathe to Alphatech on secured credit, while retaining
a PMSI in the lathe to secure repayment of its purchase price, then Methods Machine could have
assigned its security interest to Textron in exchange for the loan proceeds. The security interest
claimed by Textron would retain its original PMSI status. See 9A HAWKLAND Er AL., supra note 29,
§ 9-103:1, at 9-235 to -236 (discussing possible assignment of PMSI); see also 2 GILMORE, supra
note 46, § 29.2, at 781 ("It has always been clear that a person taking by assignment from a seller
inherited the seller's purchase-money interest.. ").
113. Perhaps the panel never addressed whether Textron held a PMSI because counsel for
Textron and United stipulated to the purchase-money status of Textron's security interest. If the
parties did indeed stipulate on that issue, the panel remains subject to criticism for failing to mention
the stipulation in the opinion, not just for the benefit of the litigants, but also for all of the other
interested constituencies who could be expected to rely on the opinion for its precedential value,
including: financial institutions, merchants, lawyers, and state and federal judges inside and outside
the Eleventh Circuit.
114. See Textron Fin., 317 E3d at 1269 (relying solely on Florida's statutory provision).
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V. THE TIMELINESS OF TEXTRON'S FILING
The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the appellate panel awarded priority
to United rather than Textron because Textron failed to timely perfect its PMSI in the
lathe.1 15  Methods Machine delivered the lathe to Alphatech on December 31,
1998.116 Because Florida's super-priority statute required Textron to perfect its
security interest no later than fifteen days after Alphatech received possession of the
lathe, all three courts concluded that Textron's filing on February 12, 1999, was
tardy.117 Textron's only argument was that the fifteen-day period did not begin until
Alphatech became a "debtor" on February 17, the date that Textron agreed to make
the loan and Alphatech granted a security interest in the lathe to Textron. 1 8 The
appellate panel was not convinced.' 19
This Court finds Textron's argument unpersuasive, and extremely susceptible to
manipulation by debtors and creditors. Under Textron's reasoning, a purchase
money security interest creditor could gain priority over a prior perfected
security interest at any time after delivery of the collateral, so long as the
financing was agreed to within the fifteen days prior to the filing of the UCC-1
financing statement.
The language of Fla. Stat. § 679.312(4) [former § 9-312(4)] is clear. Alphatech
was a debtor no later than December 31, 1998, when the Lathe was delivered to
Alphatech from Method Machines [sic] on net thirty-day terms. Therefore,
Textron had fifteen days from December 31, 1998, to properly perfect its
purchase money security interest. Since Textron did not perfect until 43 days
later on February 12, 1999, Textron did not gain priority over United's prior
perfected security interest.'
20
The panel's brief response strongly suggests that the "possession" element of the
super-priority statute operates completely independent from the "debtor" element.
12 1
In other words, the panel's message is that the purchase-money creditor will enjoy
super-priority only if its perfection is timely, with timeliness measured solely by the
debtor's "possession" and without relevance attaching to the possessor's status as a
"debtor," as that term is defined by U.C.C. Article 9.122 Based on the language of the
115. Textron Fin., 317F.3dat 1268-69.
116. Id at 1268.
117. Id. at 1268-69.
118. Id. at 1269.
119. Id
120. Textron Fin., 317F.3dat 1269.
121. See id.
122. The panel observed that "Alphatech was a debtor no later than December 31, 1998,
when the Lathe was delivered to Alphatech fiom Method Machines on net thirty-day terms." Id.
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statute, the appellate panel's interpretation appears plausible; but the opinion paints an
incomplete picture by failing to recognize that Textron's argument123 has found favor
with numerous courts and may represent the majority view. 24
Courts have struggled to interpret the statutory phrase "debtor receives
possession" and to determine what triggers the running of the super-priority filing
period. Results have been inconsistent, with courts falling into one of two camps:
section A reviews three cases that apply the "obligation" standard, the position
advocated by Textron, which examines both the debtor-creditor relationship and the
debtor's possession; section B reviews three cases that apply the "physical control"
standard, the position implicitly followed by the Alphatech Systems panel, which
focuses attention exclusively on the debtor's possession, whether or not at the
moment of initial possession the party is a "debtor." Section C offers some thoughts
on the two standards.
A. The "Obligation" Standard
This section summarizes Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v United States, 125 the "lead
case applying the 'obligation' standard,"'' 26 as well as two subsequent cases: National
Acceptance Company of California v. Community Bank (In re Ultra Precision
Industries, Inc.), 127 and Commerce Union Bank v. John Deere Industrial Equipment
Co. 1
28
Absent an enforceable security interest in the lathe, however, delivery alone would not make
Alphatech a "debtor" under U.C.C. Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28)(A) (2004) (defining
"debtor" as "a person having an interest... in the collateral"), (a)(12) (defining "collateral" as "the
property subject to a security interest"); see also former U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d) (defining "debtor" as
"the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured"). Under the
statutory definition, Alphatech did not become a "debtor" until February 17, 1999, when Textron
agreed to make the loan and Alphatech granted to Textron a security interest in the lathe. See Texton
Fin., 317 E3dat 1268.
123. I am not retreating from my observation in Part IV that Textron did not have a purchase-
money security interest in the lathe. I am merely analyzing the merits of Textron's argument that, for
the purpose of achieving super-priority, the timeliness of the purchase-money creditor's filing
requires a preliminary determination of the possessor's status as "debtor."
124. See, e.g., Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir.
1970).
125. 431 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1970).
126. Citizens Bank of Americus v. Fed. Fin. Servs., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998).
127. 503 E2d 414 (9th Cir. 1974).
128. 387 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1980). Brief summaries of other cases following the "obligation"
standard appear at Appendix I to this article.
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1. Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States
129
In 1959, Brodie Hotel Supply ("Brodie") sold restaurant equipment to a buyer
that went bankrupt; Brodie left the equipment at the restaurant. 13  With Brodie's
consent, "James Lyon took possession of the restaurant and began operating it on
June 1, 1964.,'' 3  At that time, Lyon and Brodie had not finalized the terms of the
equipment purchase, and negotiations continued for several months. 132 In early
November of 1964, Lyon borrowed $17,000 from National Bank of Alaska, with
repayment secured by a property interest in the restaurant equipment. 133 The bank
filed its financing statement on November 4.134 A few days later, on November 12,
Brodie and Lyon concluded their negotiations; Brodie then delivered a bill of sale and
received a security interest in the equipment. 135 Brodie filed its financing statement
on November 23.136
Sometime later, Brodie finally initiated a lawsuit against the United States to
determine the priority of their competing property interests in the restaurant
equipment. 137 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Brodie,
which found persuasive Brodie's argument that Lyon did not receive possession, at
least under the super-priority statute, until Lyon became an Article 9 "debtor" on
November 12.138 Because Brodie filed its financing statement within ten days of that
date, Brodie's PMSI was entitled to super-priority.
139
On appeal, the federal government argued that "debtor," as used in the super-
priority statute, was "used merely to identify an individual in possession, who
ultimately becomes indebted to the purchase-money mortgagee.' '14° The government
also reminded the court that U.C.C. Article 9 permits the secured party to file a
financing statement before the security interest becomes enforceable, even though the
129. 431 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1970).
130. Id. at 1317.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1318.
134. BrodieHotelSupply,431 E2dat 1318.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1317.
138. Seeid. at 1317, 1319.
139. Brodie Hotel Supply, 431 F.2d at 1318. The careful reader will observe that Brodie
actually filed its financing statement eleven days after Lyon granted the security interest on
November 12. Id The opinion is silent on this point, but presumably the court granted the one-day
filing extension because November 22, 1964, fell on a Sunday. Another court granted a similar one-
day extension because the final day of the super-priority filing period fell on Labor Day. See
Commerce Union Bank v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 387 So.2d 787, 789 (Ala 1980)
(summarized infra Part V.A.3.).
140. Brodie Hotel Supply, 431 F.2dat 1318.
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statutory authority for pre-filing uses the terms "debtor," "secured party," and
"security interest"--terms whose definitions would not be technically satisfied upon
pre-filing.1
4 1
The appellate panel was unconvinced, noting that the "debtor" is "the person
who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured."' 142 Relying on
this definition, the panel wrote:
Although Lyon might have been liable for the reasonable rental of the
equipment or for its return to Brodie, he did not owe performance of an
'obligation secured' by the collateral in question until November 12, 1964, and
therefore was not a 'debtor' [prior to that date] for purposes of [the super-priority
statute]. Brodie's filing was therefore within the ten-day period and Brodie has
priority over the conflicting security interest held by the SBA.1
43
2. National Acceptance Company of California v. Community Bank
(In re Ultra Precision Industries, Inc.)144
In March 1967, National Acceptance Company of California ("National
Acceptance") loaned $692,000 to Ultra Precision Industries ("Ultra"), secured by a
security interest in Ultra's current and after-acquired equipment. 145 National
Acceptance timely filed a financing statement. 146 Later, in 1967 and 1968, Ultra
placed orders with Wolf Machinery Company ('Wolf') for two machines. 147 Wolf
delivered one machine to Ultra on April 30, 1968, and the other on June 20, 1968.148
Wolf and Ultra executed a "Purchase Money Security Interest Conditional Sales
Agreement" on July 31, 1968, which Wolf assigned to Community Bank, a financial
institution that had agreed to finance Ultra's purchase.149 Community Bank filed its
financing statement on August 5, 1968.150 A similar transaction involved a third
machine that Wolf delivered to Ultra on August 7, 1968, subject to a similar sales
agreement executed by Wolf and Ultra on October 23, 1968, and assigned to C.I.T.
141. See id. at 1319.
142. Id. (quoting former U.C.C. § 9-105(d)).
143. Id. (internal citations omitted) The court acknowledged that Brodie could have filed a
financing statement long before November, "but it is also true that the bank, SBA's assignor, could
have protected itself by inquiring into Lyon's interest in the equipment before accepting his chattel
mortgage." Id
144. 503 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1974).
145. Id at 415-16.
146. Id
147. Id. at416.
148. Id
149. Nat'lAcceptance Co., 503 F.2d at 416.
150. Id
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Corporation. 151 C.I.T. Corporation filed its financing statement on October 30, 1968,
and reassigned the contract to Wolf when Ultra went bankrupt in 1969.152
A priority dispute arose, which the trial court settled in favor of Community
Bank and Wolf, and against National Acceptance, which appealed.153 National
Acceptance argued that neither Community Bank nor Wolf enjoyed PMSI super-
priority because they failed to timely file their financing statements within ten days
after Ultra received physical possession of the equipment.154 Community Bank and
Wolf replied by contending that their filings were timely because the ten-day period
did not commence until Ultra executed the sales contracts. 155 The appellate panel
agreed with Community Bank and Wolf.
1 6
The appellate panel disagreed with National Acceptance's assertion that the
reference to "debtor" in the super-priority statute could mean the debtor under the
pre-existing and conflicting security interest.1 57 "Such an interpretation does violence
to the clear language of the section, and such a thesis is inherently rejected under the
rationale and holdings" of cited cases, including Brodie Hotel Supply.1 58 Instead,
"debtor" refers to the party opposite the creditor claiming PMSI status."' Under this
reading of the statute, the purchase-money security interests held by Community
Bank and Wolf enjoyed super-priority because both creditors filed their financing
statements within ten days after National Acceptance had executed the sales
contracts.'
160
3. Commerce Union Bank v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co.
161
Commerce Union Bank ("CBC") and Alabama Forest Resources, Inc.
("Alabama Forest"), entered into a security agreement in December of 1976 covering
Alabama Forest's existing and future equipment and machinery.162 CBC filed its
financing statement on December 15, 1976. 16 On August 10, 1978, Alabama Forest
obtained possession of two pieces of equipment (a crawler and a power winch) from
John Deere Industrial Equipment Company ("John Deere") under a rental agreement
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at415.
154. Nat'lAcceptance Co., 503 E2dat417.
155. Id
156. Id
157. Id
158. Id
159. See Nat 'l Acceptance Co., 503 E2d at 417.
160. Id.
161. 387 So.2d 787 (Ala. 1980).
162. Id. at 788.
163. Id.
405
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that included a purchase option.164 Alabama Forest exercised its purchase option on
September 11, 1978, and John Deere filed its financing statement on September
2165 On August 25, 1978, Alabama Forest purchased a third piece of equipment
from John Deere, which filed a financing statement on September 5 (September 4
was Labor Day, a legal holiday). 166 In May 1979, John Deere filed a detinue suit for
personal property against CBC and Alabama Forest.' 67  The trial court entered
judgment against CBC, which appealed.168
After determining that the lease agreement for the crawler and power winch was
a true lease, rather than a secured transaction, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed
whether John Deere's PMSI was entitled to super-priority. 69 Relying on Brodie
Hotel Supply, the court observed that while Alabama Forest obtained possession of
the equipment on August 10, Alabama Forest did not become a "debtor" under the
super-priority statute until September 11, the date of the purchase agreement.'
70
"[Alabama] Forest Resources was only required to pay rent on a monthly basis for
the use of the equipment; therefore, it 'did not owe performance of an obligation
secured by the collateral in question' until the purchase agreement was executed on
September 11, 1978.'' Therefore, John Deere's filing on September 21 was timely
for the purpose of obtaining super-priority.
172
B. The "Physical Control" Standard
Not all courts have followed the Brodie Hotel Supply line of cases and its
requirement of a debtor-creditor relationship as a predicate to commencement of the
grace period for filing under the super-priority statute.173 Instead, these courts, now
joined by the Alphatech Systems panel, have focused on the party's possession of the
collateral, even if the party in possession was not yet a "debtor" as defined by U.C.C.
Article 9.
164. Id
165. Id
166. Commerce Union Bank, 387 So. 2d at 788-89.
167. Id. at 788. The "very gist" of a detinue lawsuit "is the wrongful detention by the
defendant of the plaintiffs personal property." Ray v. Blackwell, 521 So.2d 44, 45 (Ala. Civ. App.
1988).
168. Commerce Union Bank 387 So.2d at 788.
169. Id at 789-91.
170. Id. at 791.
171. Id (quoting Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 E2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir.
1970)).
172. Id at791-92.
173. See, e.g., Michaels v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Michaels), 156 B.R. 584, 589-90
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993); N. Platte State Bank v. Prod. Credit Ass'n of North Platte, 200 N.W.2d 1, 5
(Neb. 1972).
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This section summarizes the "lead case applying the 'physical control'
standard,'74 North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Association of North
Platte,75 as well as two subsequent cases: Mark Products US, Inc. v. InterFirst
Bank Houston, N.A.,176 and Michaels v. Ford Motor Credit Company (In re
Michaels). 1
77
1. North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Association of North Platte"8
Long (seller) and Tucker (buyer) made an oral contract in November 1968 for
the sale of cattle, which Long delivered to Tucker on November 30, 1968. 79 Based
on the understanding of the parties and applicable provisions of U.C.C. Article 2, the
court concluded that (i) title to the seventy-nine cows passed to Tucker at delivery and
(ii) Long was making the sale on open and unsecured credit.'8" On January 13, 1969,
Tucker drew a $17,775 check on North Platte State Bank (the "Bank") and delivered
it to Long as payment for the cattle.' 81 The Bank did not honor the check until
January 31, 1969, one day after Tucker executed the Bank's loan papers. 182 The
Bank filed its financing statement on February 5, 1969.83
In a subsequent priority dispute, the district court awarded priority to a previous
creditor, Production Credit Association of North Platte!' 84 As discussed in Part IV,
the appellate court held that the Bank was not entitled to any super-priority because it
did not have a PMSI.' 85 The court also held that the Bank would not have been
entitled to any super-priority because the Bank failed to timely file its financing
statement. 86 The court acknowledged that the Bank's filing on February 5, 1969,
occurred within ten days after it funded the loan on January 30, 1969, but the filing
date was almost two months after Tucker took possession of the cattle on November
174. Citizens Bank of Americus v. Fed. Fin. Servs., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 339, 341 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998).
175. 200 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1972).
176. 737 S.W.2d389(Tex.App. 1987).
177. 156 B.R 584 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993). Brief summaries of other cases following the
"physical control" standard appear at Appendix II to this article.
178. 200 N.W2d 1 (Neb. 1972).
179. Id at 3.
180. Id at 5.
181. Id at3.
182. Id The loan papers included a security agreement covering the seventy-nine cows. Id. at
4.
183. N. Platte State Bank 200 N.W.2d at 3.
184. Id. at4.
185. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
186. 200 N.W2d at 8.
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30, 1968.87 The Bank argued that its filing was timely because Tucker did not
become a "debtor" under the super-priority statute until January 30, 1969, when the
Bank made the loan and the parties executed the security agreement. 188 The court
was not persuaded, writing:
Manifestly, on January 30, 1969, when the Bank executed the loan, Tucker was
a 'debtor' of both the Bank and PCA.... Tucker did not or could not receive
possession from the Bank and it is uncontrovertible that he became a 'debtor' to
the Seller on November 30, 1968. While Tucker may not have been the Bank's
'debtor' until January 30, 1969, it is inescapable in the context of the Code that
he was the 'debtor' in the [super-priority statute] sense when he became a
'debtor' to PCA. On November 30, 1968, the time and the only time that he
'received' possession, Tucker was a 'debtor' of PCA and Seller only. To hold
otherwise renders the language of the statute meaningless, and purports a
construction wholly unrelated to setting up an ascertainable time standard by
which priorities may be established so that a subsequent lender can achieve
priority over the first to file....
To interpret [the super-priority statute] in the manner the Bank urges would
not only be contrary to the plain meaning of the language used in the statute but
would expose an original lender to such serious practical risks that the whole
structure of the Code would be impaired or endangered, because the original
lender could never feel sure that he could rely on his collateral in his future
dealings with the debtor.... We point out further that the grace period, although
adequate to encompass the practicalities of the ordinary financing transaction,
must necessarily be brief because of the possibility the original first to file lender
may make additional advances relying upon the existence and the possession of
after-acquired property by the borrower. It is clear that to hold otherwise would
permit a subsequent lender 2 months later, 6 months later, or perhaps a year later,
to convert an unsecured credit transaction into a first lien taking priority of the
first to file lender who had advanced substantial sums on the basis of the
acquisition and the possession of the same property to which priority is sought to
be attached. 189
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id
189. Id. at 6-7. The court also addressed the Bank's reliance on Brodie Hotel Supply in a
rather perplexing manner, stating that the earlier case was "inapposite on the facts," noting that "[t]he
court reached the correct decision," and observing that the decision had been "seriously criticized."
Id at 7.
The court's concern that a creditor might convert its unsecured loan into a secured loan several
months after the initial funding and then claim super-priority is unwarranted-at least under revised
U.C.C. Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-103, cmt. 3 (2004) (quoted in part and discussed supra at note 108).
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2. Mark Products U.S., Inc. v. InterFirst Bank Houston, N.A.
19 0
In early 1982, Mark Products U.S., Inc. ("Mark Products"), sold seismic
exploration equipment on an open account and unsecured basis to Vibrosearch, Inc.,
and affiliated entities.' 9' Mark Products delivered the equipment no later than
May. 9' In June of 1982, InterFirst Bank Houston, N.A. ("InterFirst Bank"),
established a secured line of credit in favor of Vibrosearch, which along with its
affiliated entities, executed security agreements and guaranties.' 9  The collateral
included the seismic equipment sold by Mark Products.' 94 InterFirst filed its
financing statements in July.195 When Mark Products became concerned about the
amount of debt owed by the Vibrosearch companies, it converted its unsecured debt
to secured debt pursuant to a security agreement executed on September 1, 1982, and
filed its financing statement two days later. 1
96
When the Vibrosearch companies defaulted on their obligations to both creditors,
a priority dispute arose between them.197 The trial court awarded priority to InterFirst
Bank, and Mark Products appealed, arguing that it held a PMSI entitled to super-
priority in the equipment.' 98 The appellate court concluded that Mark Products did
not hold a PMSI because the parties originally contemplated an unsecured credit
sale.' 99 Even if Mark Products held a PMSI, its interest would not have been entitled
to super-priority because its filing occurred more than twenty days after delivery.
200
The court was not persuaded by Brodie Hotel Supply and its conclusion that the grace
period for filing did not start until the obligor had become a "debtor" and the parties
190. 737 S.W2d 389 (Tex. App. 1987).
191. Id. at 390.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Mark Prods. U.S., 737 S.W.2d at 390.
196. Id. at 390-91. Mark Products filed its financing statement only in Texas. Id at 391.
Because former § 9-103(1) prompted the creditor to file its financing statement in the state where the
collateral was located, Mark Products may not have had a perfected security interest in equipment
not located in Texas. If, however, the seismic equipment was "mobile goods," then the Texas filing
would be appropriate under the "debtor's location" test of former § 9-103(3) because Vibrosearch's
principal place of business was in Texas. Id. at 390.
Mark Products may have been unperfected with respect to the seismic equipment owned by the
affiliated entities, rather than Vibrosearch, because Mark Products filed only against Vibrosearch. Id
at 391.
197. MarkProds. US., 737 S.W.2dat391.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 394.
200. Id. at 393-94.
HeinOnline  -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 409 2004-2005
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
had created an enforceable security interest.2° 1 The court's analysis is worth quoting
at length:
The holder of the first-in-time security interest can anticipate that its interest will
not have priority where property subsequently acquired by the debtor is
protected by a properly perfected purchase money security interest. But where
property is already in the possession of the debtor for a period in excess of
twenty days, the conscientious and diligent lender who gives value and properly
perfects its security interest in that collateral has a right to rely upon the priorities
and protection afforded under the first-to-file provisions. The Code's notice
system of filing provides a warning to possible lenders that another creditor
already has an interest in goods in the debtor's possession. Where there is no
such notice of record and where the debtor has been in possession for more than
twenty days, a creditor may rely upon mere possession of the collateral as
sufficient evidence of ownership and extend credit without further inquiry.
Regardless of the secured creditor's actual knowledge of the debtor's obligations
to unsecured creditors, its priority cannot be defeated by the seller or financer of
the goods who had a twenty-day grace period in which to perfect a purchase
money security interest and neglected to do so. Without these protections there
can be no certainty in commercial transactions....
The Texas UCC does not make the semantic distinction urged by Mark
Products. "Collateral" is defined as "the property subject to a security interest...."
A "debtor" is one "who owes payment or other performance of the obligation
secured. .. ." However, the Texas UCC actually uses the term "collateral" not
only to identify property subject to a security interest but also to identify
property which ultimately becomes the subject of a security interest. Likewise,
the Texas UCC actually uses "debtor" to refer to that person or entity who is
obligated, or ultimately becomes obligated, to a creditor. For example, [former
section 9-402(1)] requires that a financing statement give the name of the
"debtor" and a description of the "collateral." The section further states, "A
financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a
security interest otherwise attaches." Were Mark Products' arguments to be
adopted, this last quoted sentence would be without meaning because there
would be no "debtor" and no "collateral" to describe before the security
agreement came into being. The Texas UCC does not limit the use of the terms
to persons or objects in a specific time frame; nor should we.
We hold that Vibrosearch, Inc., was a debtor in possession of the collateral
twenty days after delivery, a date no later than June 20, 1982. Since Mark
Products did not file its financing statement until September 3, 1982, it did not
perfect its security interest within the requisite twenty-day grace period, and it
201. Id at 392-93.
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cannot qualify for the special priority afforded to a purchase money security
interest under § 9.312(d). It is not disputed that InterFirst perfected its security
interest in July. Therefore, we further hold that InterFirst held the first priority
security interest in all the seismic exploration equipment.202
3. Michaels v. Ford Motor Credit Company (In re Michaels)
203
F & M Bank of Slinger (the "Bank") obtained a security interest in all current
and future farm equipment owned by Gordon and Kathy Michaels in July 1988.20
The Bank filed its financing statement on July 21, 1988.205
The Michaels's purchased six pieces of farm equipment from Dairyland
Equipment, Inc. ("Dairyland"), during 1990 and 1991, all financed by Jonn Deere
Company ("Deere"). 20 6 In each transaction, the Michaels's signed a purchase order
and, simultaneously or soon thereafter, a Deere loan contract and security
207
agreement. Dairyland delivered the equipment to the Michaels's before Deere
approved fiancing.2 8 Deere filed its six financing statements more than twenty
days after executing the loan contracts and security agreements.20 9 In five of the six
transactions, Deere filed the financing statements more than twenty days after
Dairyland had delivered the equipment to the Michaels's.
210
After the Michaels's filed a bankruptcy petition, a priority dispute arose between
the Bank and Deere. 211 The dispute concemed whether Deere's PMSI was entitled to
212
super-priority, which turned on whether Deere timely filed its financing statements.
The Bank argued that Deere's filings were not timely because they were not made
within twenty days after Dairyland delivered the equipment; Deere contended that
five of its filings were timely because they occurred within twenty days after Deere
accepted the loan contracts and security agreements.
2 13
202. Mark Prods. US., 737 S.W2d at 393-94 (internal citations omitted).
203. 156 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1993).
204. Id. at 587-88.
205. Id at 588.
206. Id at 588, 594 (Schedule "A").
207. Id. at 588.
208. Michaels, 156 B.R. at 588.
209. Id
210. Id at 588-89.
211. Id. at 587-88.
212. Id at 589. Without deciding the issue, the court found Deere's claim of a PMSI
"questionable." Id at 588 n.4.
213. Michaels, 156 B.R. at 589. Deere argued that its filing in the sixth transaction on May
16, 1991, was timely because it occurred within twenty days of delivery on April 28, 1991. Id The
court, however, concluded that the actual delivery date was much earlier and the filing was not
timely. Id at 591.
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The court acknowledged that previous decisions had adopted either a "physical
control" test or an "obligation" test in determining the trigger date for the timely filing
requirement of the super-priority statute. 214 The court concluded that the former test
provided "the better approach":
2 15
It reduces the risk of mistaken reliance by potential or existing creditors on the
debtor's apparent ownership of assets. It promotes the underlying policies of the
Uniform Commercial Code in affording certainty, predictability for commercial
transactions, and public disclosure.... In contrast, the "obligation" standard relied
upon by John Deere provides an opportunity for mischief and transforms the 20-
day grace period into an open-ended time for perfection. It gives potential PMSI
creditors the ability to delay or entirely avoid the filing requirement.216
Also, the court was not persuaded by Deere's logic that the twenty-day period could
not start until Deere signed the loan contracts and security agreements, at which time
the Michaels became a "debtor" and the farm equipment became "collateral. ' 217 The
court believed that those terms were "words of identification only" and "not used in
the statute to fix the time within which the 20-day period for perfection is to
commence."2 1 8 Because Deere's filings were not timely, it was not entitled to super-
priority in any of the farm equipment.
C. Questions to Ponder
The preceding cases, as well as those summarized at Appendix I and Appendix
II, reveal that courts are not uniformly interpreting the non-inventory super-priority
statute when delivery of the collateral precedes the creation of the PMSI. Some
courts are proponents of the "obligation" standard, which looks for the moment when
the debtor-creditor relationship and possession first coincide.220 Other courts favor
the "physical control" standard, which focuses on possession, even if the party in
possession is not yet a "debtor" under U.C.C. Article 9.221 While not advocating one
position over the other, Article 9 does encourage courts to recognize and address the
difficult issues posed by the statute. Further, it seeks to promote articulate, well-
214. Id. at 589 (citing Jack T. Comman, Wen is a Debtor "In Possession" Under U.C.C §
9-312(4)?, 19 ARIz. ST. L.J. 261,263 (1987)).
215. Michaels, 156 B.R. at 590.
216. Id. at590-91.
217. Id at 591.
218. Id.
219. Id
220. See, e.g., supra Part V.A. and infra Appendix I.
221. See, e.g., supra Part VB. and infra Appendix H.
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reasoned, and thoughtful analysis in a manner not quite as brief and one-sided as the
appellate panel's presentation in In re Alphatech Systems.
When confronting the phrase, "the debtor receives possession of the collateral,"
courts must consider the intended meaning of "debtor." Is the statute using the term
merely to identify the party in possession, or is the statute referencing the technical
term as defined by U.C.C. Article 9?222 If the latter is the case, can the definition be
met by examining the party's relationship only with the creditor that is asserting
purchase-money status, or can the definition be satisfied by focusing on the party's
relationship with any creditor (including a pre-existing creditor that is asserting
priority through its after-acquired property clause)?
2 23
When the debtor receives possession of the collateral before the PMSI is created,
courts must determine which event-delivery or attachment-triggers the running of
the super-priority filing period and whether the answer should turn on the reason for
the pre-attachment delivery. For example, the debtor may take possession pursuant
to a true lease with a purchase option that the debtor exercises days, weeks, or months
after taking possession.2 24 Maybe the debtor took possession solely for the purpose
222. See, e.g., Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1970)
(concluding that "debtor" has the defined meaning); Michaels v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re
Michaels), 156 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993) (concluding that "debtor" and "collateral" are
"words of identification only" and "not used in the statute to fix the time within which the 20-day
period for perfection is to commence"); Mark Prods. U.S., Inc. v. InterFirst Bank Houston, N.A., 737
S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. App. 1987) (declining to interpret "debtor" by reference to a specific
moment); Comman, supra note 214, at 266 & n.49 (relying on former § 9-402(1) and Grant
Gilmore's commentary on the phrase "debtor receives possession" to conclude that the term "is
probably meant as a word of identification"); Louis W Payne, Jr., Comment, Uniform Commercial
Code-Protection for the Purchase Money Secured Party Under Section 9-312, 49 N.C. L. REV. 849,
851 (1971) (acknowledging that "[ilt is not clear whether 'debtor' is used merely to identify the party
or whether it is also used to establish the time at which the ten-day [now twenty-day] period begins to
run") (alteration in original); id at 853 (noting that the term "debtor" on a financing statement that is
filed before the security interest attaches "merely refers to a person who expects to become a debtor"
and suggesting that a court could apply the same meaning to the term in the super-priority statute
when delivery of the collateral precedes attachment of the security interest).
223. See Murray Zeitlin, Note, Purchase Money Security Interest Priority Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: When Does Section 9-312(4) ' Grace Period Begin to Run?, 48 TEMPLE L.Q.
1025, 1027 (1975) ("A question thus arises as to whether the term 'debtor' in [the super-priority
statute] embraces the relationship between the borrower and a prior secured lender or whether the
term is restricted to the relationship between the borrower and his purchase money mortgagee."); see
also Nat'l Acceptance Co. of California v. Cmty. Bank (In re Ultra Precision Indus., Inc.), 503 F.2d
414, 417 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting creditor's argument that "debtor" can refer to the party in a
relationship with the non-PMSI creditor as "an interpretation [that] does violence to the clear
language of the section"); N. Platte State Bank v. Prod. Credit Ass'n of North Platte, 200 N.W2d 1, 6
(Neb. 1972) (observing that the buyer's pre-existing relationship with a non-PMSI creditor made the
buyer a "debtor" in the context of the super-priority statute).
224. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Assocs. Capital Co., 491 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1974) (debtor
began leasing Caterpillar tractors in February and March 1969 and did not exercise purchase option
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of inspecting the collateral in order to make a well-informed (but subsequent) choice
to purchase the item on credit.225 Perhaps the debtor took possession pursuant to a
until October 1969); Color Leasing 3, L.P. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 975 F Supp. 177, 180 (D.R.I.
1997) (debtor began leasing printing press in 1980 and did not exercise purchase option until 1988);
Coastal Bank v. Douglas Asphalt Co. (In re Galbreath Clearing and Grading, Inc.), 258 B.R. 859, 861
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000) (debtor began leasing equipment in February 1998 and did not exercise
purchase option until October 1998); Iron Peddlers, Inc. v. Ivie & Assocs., Inc. (In re Ivie & Assocs.,
Inc.), 84 B.R. 882, 883 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (debtor began leasing scraping equipment in May
and June 1985 and did not exercise purchase option until September 1985); Commerce Union Bank
v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 387 So. 2d 787, 788 (Ala- 1980) (debtor began leasing crawler and
power winch on August 10, 1978, and did not exercise purchase option until September 11, 1978);
Ranier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 631 P.2d 389, 391 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (debtor began
leasing Caterpillar front loader in November 1978 and did not exercise purchase option until January
or February 1979).
The drafters of revised U.C.C. Article 9 have indicated their belief that when a party agrees to
buy goods on credit after initially taking possession of the goods under a transaction not governed by
U.C.C. Article 9, the twenty-day filing period does not commence until the goods have become
"collateral."
For example, a person may take possession of goods as lessee under a lease contract and
then exercise an option to purchase the goods from the lessor on secured credit. Under
Section 2A-307(1), creditors of the lessee generally take subject to the lease contract;
filing a financing statement against the lessee is unnecessary to protect the lessor's
leasehold or residual interest. Once the lease is converted to a security interest, filing a
financing statement is necessary to protect the seller's (former lessor's) security interest.
Accordingly, the 20-day period in... [the super-priority statute] does not commence until
the goods become "collateral" (defined in Section 9-102), i.e., until they are subject to a
security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-324, cmt. 3 (2004); cf HoNNoLD ET AL., supra note 47, at 254 ("Is Comment 3
persuasive? Is it an appropriate use of the Comments?"). Although most state legislatures do not
enact the official comments into law, the majority of courts view them as "highly persuasive
authority." Pride Hyundai, Inc. v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 369 F.3d 603, 614 (1st Cir. 2004); see also
Aciemo v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline Corp., 656 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Del. 1995) ("An official comment [to
the U.C.C.] written by the drafters of a statute and available to a legislature before the statute is
enacted has considerable weight as an aid to statutory construction."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 1.9, at 47 (internal footnotes omitted) (3d ed. 2004):
In practice, courts have given considerable weight to the comments--more than that
ordinarily accorded an authoritative treatise or article but less than that accorded the text
itself If the statutory provisions adopted by the legislature contradict the comments, the
comments must clearly be rejected. The more difficult problem arises where the
comments make assertions as to matters on which the text is silent, and here also courts
have often rejected the comments.
Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 597, 631 (1966) ("As aids toward understanding and uniform application of the Code, courts
may be expected to pay very serious attention to what the comments have to say. We should realize,
however, that the comments are the work of human beings-gifted human beings, to be sure, but still
human beings.").
225. See, e.g., United States v. Hooks (In re Hooks), 40 B.R. 715, 720 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
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"sale on approval" but did not manifest its approval for some period of time.226
Possibly, the seller delivered the collateral to accommodate a preferred customer, to
land a sought-after customer, to assist a customer who represented that third-party
financing was, or soon would be, in place, or to aid a customer confronting an
emergency, but the debtor did not execute the security agreement and other loan
papers for several days for some plausible reason (e.g., the proper forms could not be
located, the forms were mailed to an incorrect address, the paperwork was misplaced,
an authorized signatory was on vacation or in the hospital, etc.). 227 Should the super-
priority statute be applied in a consistent manner to all of these, and possibly other,
scenarios where the debtor takes possession before the PMSI is created? Or might
the reason for pre-attachment delivery justify non-uniform application?
1984) (evidence revealed that debtor had taken care of cattle for several weeks prior to purchase-
money loan "for the purpose of inspecting and milking the cows so that he could be sure that he
wanted to purchase them"); Citizens Bank of Americus v. Fed. Fin. Servs., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 339, 340
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (seller delivered skidder to buyer on December 18, 1996, for demonstration
purposes only; buyer executed sales contract on December 30, 1996, and promissory note and
collateral documents on February 6, 1997).
226. See, e.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. Bank of California, N.A. (In re Prior Bros., Inc.), 632
P.2d 522, 524 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (seller delivered tractor to debtor soon after April 8, 1976;
parties understood delivery was "on approval"; debtor elected to purchase tractor sometime later by
mailing a $6,000 check as down payment, which creditor received on April 22, 1976). In dissent,
Chief Judge Mclnturff relied on several U.C.C. provisions to conclude that the seller retained a
security interest in the tractor that arose upon delivery, even though the transaction was a sale on
approval. Id at 531-32. Yet the security interest would not be enforceable until the buyer executed
or authenticated a security agreement. See former U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (2004) (requiring, as a
condition to attachment of a security interest in goods, the debtor to sign a security agreement unless
the creditor possesses the collateral); U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (same, except requiring the debtor to
authenticate a security agreement).
227. See, e.g., Nat'l Acceptance Co. of California v. Cmty. Bank (In re Ultra Precision Indus.,
Inc.), 503 F.2d 414,416 (9th Cir. 1974) (seller delivered machines to debtor on April 30 and June 20,
1968, but parties did not execute conditional sales contract until July 31, 1968; seller delivered a third
machine to debtor on August 7, 1968, but parties did not execute conditional sales contract until
October 23, 1968); Hunter v. McHenry (In re McHenry), 71 B.R. 60, 62 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)
(debtor took possession of vehicle on or about March 14, 1986, but did not execute promissory note
or security agreement in favor of credit union until March 27, 1986); Bank One, N.A. v. Farmers
Prod. Credit of Ashland (In re Miller), 44 B.R. 716, 717 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (buyer received
possession of tractor in February 1977 but did not execute security agreement and promissory note in
favor of purchase-money lender until March 18, 1977); Ranier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 631
P.2d 389, 399 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (McInturff, C.J., dissenting) (offering hypothetical involving
farmer
in dire need to purchase a replacement combine [during harvest season and dealer is]
unable to locate the necessary forms to close the transaction but because time is of the
essence and because of past dealings with the farmer, he allows him to take possession of
the machine with the understanding the written installment sales contract and security
agreement will be executed in the near future.
The parties went on to execute the required documents two weeks later).
HeinOnline  -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 415 2004-2005
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
Courts must also recognize that the two standards may raise competing policy
concerns. Does the "obligation" standard create the opportunity for the purchase-
money creditor and its obligor to manipulate the super-priority statute to the detriment
of other reliance creditors, thereby undermining U.C.C. Article 9's notice function by
discouraging early filing?2 28  Would a prudent creditor extend additional credit
against the item or hesitate to exercise its rights and remedies against any of the
collateral based solely on its observation that the debtor has possessed the item for a
brief period of time without making any inquiry into the type of property interest held
by the debtor and other parties?229 Does the "physical control" standard fail to
228. See Michaels v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Michaels), 156 B.R. 584, 590-91 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1993) (concluding that the "physical control" standard "reduces the risk of mistaken
reliance by potential or existing creditors on the debtor's apparent ownership of assets," whereas the
"obligation" standard "provides an opportunity for mischief and transforms the 20-day grace period
into an open-ended time for perfection" because it "gives potential PMSI creditors the ability to delay
or entirely avoid the filing requirement"); Valley Bank v. Estate of Rainsdon, 793 P.2d 1257, 1262
(Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (expressing concern with an interpretation that would permit a buyer and a
seller to carefully negotiate contract terms in an attempt to delay indefinitely the filing of a financing
statement and, by doing so, frustrate the "carefully defined" statutory rights of creditors); N. Platte
State Bank v. Prod. Credit Ass'n of North Platte, 200 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Neb. 1972):
To interpret [the super-priority statute]... in the manner the Bank urges... would expose
an original lender to such serious practical risks that the whole structure of the Code would
be impaired or endangered, because the original lender could never feel sure that he could
rely on his collateral in his future dealings with the debtor.
HONNOLD E7 AL., supra note 47, at 255 ("Does delaying the commencement of the 20-day period
undercut the policy of favoring public notice and the policy against 'secret' liens?"); Comman, supra
note 214, at 280-81 (observing that the 'physical control" standard, which applies "regardless of the
legal status of the transaction," better promotes early filing than does the "obligation" standard);
Zeitlin, supra note 223, at 1031 (recognizing that the "obligation" standard "creates a clear potential
for abuse").
229. See, e.g., Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1970)
(acknowledging that while the seller could have filed a financing statement as soon as Lyon, the
potential buyer, took possession of the restaurant equipment, "it is also true that the bank... could
have protected itself by inquiring into Lyon's interest in the equipment before accepting his chattel
mortgage"). But see Mark Prods. U.S., Inc. v. InterFirst Bank Houston, N.A., 737 S.W.2d 389, 393
(Tex. App. 1987) ("Where there is no such notice of record and where the debtor has been in
possession for more than twenty days, a creditor may rely upon mere possession of the collateral as
sufficient evidence of ownership and extend credit without further inquiry.") (emphasis added); Baird
& Jackson, supra note 47, at 198-99 (observing that "inquiry into ownership necessitates a search for
rights which a third party cannot observe because they are determined in large part by contract,"
arguing that "[n]one of the policies underlying Article 9 suggest that the time limit for obtaining
purchase money priority should start to run upon an event, such as the signing of a conditional sales
contract, that no third party can observe," and rejecting any "two-party test, based on title or any
other metaphysical notion, for determining when third parties can enjoy the protection of the
ostensible ownership principle"); Cornman, supra note 214, at 271-72 (arguing that existing and
potential creditors have a "greater difficulty" in inquiring into the debtor's interest in collateral, and
contending that "policing the transaction is easier for the PMSI creditor" who "is aware of and a
party to the transaction"); Payne, supra note 222, at 852 (referring to this inquiry as "ludicrously
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acknowledge that the debtor may have possession of items pursuant to a transaction
not covered by U.C.C. Article 9 and its filing requirements? 230 If so, would it be
unfair to place a possession-sensitive filing requirement on a non-Article 9 party that
eventually must file anyway in order to obtain super-priority?2
3 1
Forceful arguments favoring or criticizing the two standards have been made.
Not everyone will agree on the answers to these questions. But most would agree
that the questions deserve to be addressed, not with the stark brevity of the appellate
panel in In re Alphatech Systems, but in a thoughtful well-reasoned manner that
recognizes the various technical, substantive, and policy-oriented perspectives.
VI. CONCLUSION
U.C.C. Article 9 favors PMSIs through several provisions, including section 9-
324(a), which affords the second-in-time creditor with first-in-line status if the
creditor's security interest in the non-inventory collateral is timely perfected.
232
Courts are reminded that the provision applies only if the creditor can establish that its
security interest enjoys purchase-money status under section 9-103. If the creditor's
security interest is a PMSI, then the security interest will enjoy super-priority over
other competing security interests if the purchase-money creditor perfects its security
interest no later than the twentieth day after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral.23 3 The labyrinth of caselaw that began over thirty years ago illustrates that
courts continue to struggle with discerning when "the debtor receives possession of
the collateral" if the collateral is delivered to the debtor before the parties have created
an enforceable security interest. The numerous holdings have generated the
difficult").
230. Although the debtor may take possession of the goods under a transaction that is not
initially a secured transaction, U.C.C. Article 9 does permit the parties to file a precautionary
financing statement using such terms as "lessor" and "lessee," as well as "bailor" and "bailee,"
without conceding that the transaction is indeed a secured transaction. See former U.C.C. 9-408;
U.C.C. § 9-505.
231. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 47, at 200 (suggesting that extending the filing rules to
all divisions of ownership and possession "would reduce litigation"); Jason Butscher, To File or Not
to File: The Current Confusion of When and How to Comply with Article 9-312, 25 TEx. TECH L.
REV. 173, 188-89 (1993) (advocating forced filing for all leases exceeding twenty days); Comman,
supra note 214, at 282 (observing that "filing costs are minimal and eventually would be necessary
under the obligation standard"); Payne, supra note 222, at 852 (referring to "the ease with which the
opposing [purchase-money] party could have avoided the conflict in the first place" by the "simple
expedient of filing a [financing] statement"). But see HONNOLD Er AL., supra note 47, at 255
(suggesting that it is "appropriate to delay commencement of the 20-day period [of § 9-324(a)] until
the relationship of the parties falls within the scope of Article 9"); Zeitlin, supra note 223, at 1033
(arguing that "courts should not discourage flexibility in commercial relationships by requiring the
filing of financing statements in transactions not govemed by Article 9").
232. See U.C.C. § 9-324(a).
233. Id.
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"obligation" and "physical control" standards, with the former focusing on
attachment and the latter looking at possession. Each standard raises a host of
significant questions. Courts are encouraged to carefully and thoroughly address
these questions in their written opinions, by providing answers that promote the
underlying purposes and policies of both section 9-324(a) and the U.C.C.
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APPENDIX I
Cases (in chronological order) applying the
"obligation" standard discussed in Part V
Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 631 P.2d 389 (1981): In November
1978, the debtor executed a rental agreement and a purchase option agreement with
the creditor covering a Caterpillar front-loader. The debtor took possession of the
loader during that month. In February 1979, the debtor exercised its purchase option
by signing and mailing a conditional sales contract and security agreement (each
dated February 15) on February 26. The creditor filed its financing statement on
March 5. The trial court refused to award super-priority to the creditor, which
appealed. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the initial lease agreement was a true lease or a disguised secured transaction.
The appellate court also held that if the lease agreement was a true lease, then the ten-
day filing period referenced in the super-priority statute would not begin to run until
the loader became "collateral" (i.e., "property subject to a security interest"); this did
not occur until the debtor signed the security agreement on February 26. Therefore, if
the lease agreement was a true lease, then the creditor's filing on March 5 was timely
for the purpose of super-priority.
Int'l Harvester Co. v. Bank of Cal., N.A. (In re Prior Bros., Inc.), 632 E2d
522 (1981): The debtor signed a retail installment contract with the seller on April 8,
1976, for a tractor, which the seller delivered soon thereafter. The parties understood
that delivery was "on approval;" the debtor could elect to purchase the tractor by
informing the seller of its decision and making a $6,000 down payment. The seller
received a $6,000 check from the debtor on April 22; the seller filed a financing
statement five days later. When the seller sought a declaratory judgment that its
PMSI in the tractor enjoyed super-priority, the trial court concluded that the seller had
failed to timely file its financing statement under the super-priority statute. The
appellate court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine "whether the sale
of the tractor was absolute or on approval." Id. at 527. If the sale was absolute, then
the seller failed to timely file its financing statement under the super-priority statute.
But if the sale was "on approval"--with acceptance on April 22--then the seller
enjoyed super-priority because it was not until April 22 that Prior Brothers became a
"debtor in possession" of the tractor. The court acknowledged the two lines of cases
interpreting the super-priority statute, concluding that Brodie Hotel Supply and
similar cases represented "the better statement of the law." Id at 528. "[I]t is when
the purchaser of goods becomes a debtor, i.e., owes an obligation secured by the
collateral, that the time period allowed under [the super-priority statute] begins to run.
When the sale is one on approval, that event takes place at the approval of the
contract." Id. at 530.
United States v. Hooks (In re Hooks), 40 B.R 715 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984):
The debtor borrowed $111,700 from a creditor on January 18, 1980, to purchase
cattle. The creditor filed its financing statement on January 21, 1980. After the
debtor filed a bankruptcy petition in 1981, a priority dispute arose as to some of the
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cattle purchased by the debtor in January 1980. The debtor had taken care of the
cattle for several weeks prior to the loan, so that he could inspect them and decide
whether he wanted to purchase them. Additionally, the debtor did not obtain title to
the cows before the loan was funded. As a result, the debtor did not become a
"debtor" until January 18, and it was not until that date that he had "possession"
under the super-priority statute. Because the creditor filed its financing statement
three days later, its PMSI was entitled to super-priority.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. First State Bank, 674 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App. 1984):
A bank loaned $35,000 to the debtor in September 1977 to finance the debtor's
purchase of parts inventory from another vehicle dealership. The debtor began
operating the other vehicle dealership on September 16, but the parties did not
execute the bill of sale until September 27, which was the same day that the bank
funded the loan. The bank had filed its financing statement one day earlier on
September 26. The trial court awarded super-priority to the bank over a previous
creditor, which later appealed, contending that the bank's filing was untimely. The
appellate court disagreed and relied heavily on Brodie Hotel Supply in its analysis,
stating:
[I]t cannot be said that from the facts and evidence here that the conduct of [the
other vehicle dealership] in pernitting [the debtor] to 'operate the business'
amounted to surrendering possession of the inventory of its business to [the
debtor]. The evidence affirmatively shows that actual possession and control of
the inventory was not turned over to [the debtor] until September 27, 1977, at
which time the former dealership executed a bill of sale to [the debtor] upon
receipt of the bank's advance of the $35,000.00 to pay on the inventory.
Certainly, under the facts here, [the debtor] had no actual physical control over
the entire inventory of parts owned by [the other vehicle dealership] before the
closing of the sale contemplated by the agreement between those parties and the
delivery by [the other vehicle dealership] of its bill of sale on September 27,
1977.
Id at 443. As the debtor did not acquire "possession" of the other vehicle
dealership's inventory until September 27, the bank's filing was timely and its PMSI
was entitled to super-priority.
Bank One, N.A. v. Farmers Prod. Credit (In re Miller), 44 B.R_ 716 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1984): The debtors signed a purchase agreement with the seller in
December 1976 to acquire a tractor. The financing bank argued for super-priority
because it filed its financing statement on March 25, within ten days after the debtors
signed the bank's security agreement and promissory note on March 18. A pre-
existing creditor argued that the filing was not timely, however, because the debtors
had taken possession of the tractor at least one week before obtaining financing.
After acknowledging the divergent applications of the super-priority statute, the
bankruptcy court elected to phrase the issue as follows: "When was Miller possessed
of this tractor as a 'debtor'?" Id. at 720. The court held that the debtors did not
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become "debtors" until they executed the bank's financing documents on March 18,
making the bank's filing on March 25 timely for purposes of obtaining super-priority.
Hunter v. McHenry (In re McHenry), 71 B.R. 60 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987):
The debtor arranged for her credit union to finance an automobile purchase. She took
possession of the vehicle on or about March 14, 1986, but she did not execute a
promissory note or security agreement in favor of the credit union until March 27.
The credit union perfected its security interest in the vehicle on April 2. The
bankruptcy court held that the ten-day super-priority perfection period did not
commence until the debtor and her credit union had created an enforceable security
interest in the vehicle, even if the debtor had possession of the vehicle before that
date. As the parties did not create the security interest until March 27, the credit
union's filing on April 2 was deemed timely.
De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990): In September
1983, the debtor purchased 324 head of cattle from a seller. The parties agreed that
the seller retained title to the cattle until the debtor's check was honored. The cattle
arrived in four trucks, three arriving on September 15, and the fourth arriving the next
day. On September 16, the debtor drew a check on its financial institution (the
debtor's primary financing source for his cattle operations) as payment for the cattle.
The financial institution informed the debtor on September 27 that it would not honor
the check. On September 30, the debtor obtained a $45,000 loan from another bank
and used the proceeds to pay for the cattle, which served as collateral for the loan.
The bank filed its financing statement on October 14. The trial court held that even if
the bank had a PMSI in the cattle it was not entitled to super-priority because the
bank filed its financing statement more than twenty days after the debtor obtained
possession of the cattle. After reviewing several cases, the appellate court concluded
that the bank enjoyed super-priority. The court concluded that the twenty-day filing
period did not begin to run until the debtor and the bank entered into a debtor-creditor
relationship on September 30, so the bank's filing on October 14 was timely.
Color Leasing 3, L.P. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 975 F. Supp. 177 (D.R.I.
1997): The debtor leased a printing press from a creditor sometime in 1980. The
lease expired in June 1988. The debtor elected to purchase the printing press for
$360,000 to be paid over three years. The debtor executed a promissory note and a
security agreement (covering the printing press and other assets) on December 31,
1988. The creditor filed its financing statement on January 5, 1989. After the debtor
defaulted on loans from a bank, the bank seized and sold some of the debtor's assets,
including the printing press. The creditor sued the bank for conversion, alleging that
it had held a superior PMSI in the printing press. Without much analysis, other than
observing "critical similarity" with the Brodie Hotel Supply line of cases, the court
chose to focus attention on the debtor-creditor relationship between the debtor and the
creditor, concluding that the relationship began not when the debtor executed the bill
of sale on December 31, 1987, but rather when the debtor executed the promissory
note on December 31, 1988. Since the creditor filed its financing statement six days
later, its PMSI enjoyed super-priority.
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Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc. (In re Hughes),
230 B.R. 213 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998): Beginning in January 1994 and ending in
March 1997, the debtor entered into six purchase-money transactions with equipment
dealers. In each transaction the security agreement--conditional sales contract was
assigned to a creditor that filed its financing statements within fifteen days of the
relevant contract date. The debtor testified in a bankruptcy court that he took
possession of the equipment "a few weeks" before he signed the relevant security
agreement, but the creditor testified that the debtor executed the contracts "within a
day of delivery." Id. at 221. The court felt no need to resolve the conflicting
testimony because, citing In re Hooks (also decided by the bankruptcy court for the
Middle District of Georgia), the debtor did not become obligated to purchase the
equipment until he signed the contracts and became a "debtor." Since the creditor
filed its financing statements within the fifteen-day statutory period following the
execution date of each contract, its filings were timely for purposes of the super-
priority statute.
Citizens Bank of Americus v. Fed. Fin. Servs., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998): The bank loaned $22,520 to the debtor on December 5, 1996. The loan
was secured by a security interest in a logging skidder that the debtor was negotiating
to acquire (but the debtor used the loan proceeds to satisfy other debts, not to
purchase the skidder). The bank promptly filed its financing statement. The seller
delivered the skidder to the debtor on December 18 for demonstration purposes only.
The debtor executed a sales contract on December 30. After the debtor obtained the
necessary insurance, it executed a promissory note and collateral documents on
February 6, 1977, in favor of a financer, which remitted the loan proceeds to the
seller. The financer perfected its PMSI by filing its financing statement on February
10. In a subsequent priority dispute, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the
financer. The bank appealed, contending that the financer was not entitled to super-
priority because its filing on February 10 was not within fifteen days of the seller's
delivery of the skidder to the debtor on December 18. The court observed that the
debtor was a mere bailee until it acquired ownership of the skidder on February 6,
when the debtor's possession and indebtedness "first coincided." The court then
reviewed Brodie Hotel Supply and North Platte State Bank and made the following
observation:
The Brodie line of cases, similar to the present one, involved sales on approval.
This resulted in holdings that the [super-priority statute's] grace period did not
begin to run until the purchase money obligation was assumed. North Platte
and cases following it involved situations in which the buyer or lessee owed
performance of an obligation secured by the property at the time physical
possession was acquired. This resulted in holdings that the time period allowed
by the statute began to run at that time. In none of the cases was it held that the
running of the grace period was triggered before the debtor owed performance
of the secured obligation.
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Id at 342. The court finally concluded that the financer enjoyed super-priority
because it filed its financing statement within fifteen days after the debtor acquired
ownership of the skidder and executed the promissory note evidencing its purchase
obligation.
Coastal Bank v. Douglas Asphalt Co. (In re Galbreath Clearing and
Grading, Inc.), 258 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000): "On October 16, 1998, [the
debtor] executed a retail installment contract and security agreement" covering "five
pieces of equipment" being purchased from the seller. Id at 860. The seller filed its
financing statement on October 26, reflecting an assignee. The debtor had taken
possession of the equipment in February 1998 under the terms of a short-term lease.
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court (after concluding that the lease was a true lease)
awarded super-priority to the assignee, relying on Citizens Bank of Americus and
Brodie Hotel Supply to conclude that the purchase-money filing was timely. "Even
though [the debtor] had possession and use of the equipment by virtue of the earlier
five month short-term lease agreement, [the debtor] did not receive possession, as a
debtor in the transaction at issue, until the documents were executed on October 16,
1998." Id at 866.
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APPENDIX U
Cases (in chronological order) applying the
' physical control"standard discussed in Part V
James Talcott, Inc. v. Assocs. Capital Co., 491 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1974): The
lessor delivered a Caterpillar tractor to the lessee on February 17, 1969. The parties
executed a lease agreement on February 25; the lessor filed financing statements on
March 3. The lessor delivered a second Caterpillar tractor to the lessee on March 14.
The parties executed a lease agreement on April 22; the lessor filed financing
statements on April 28. The lessee exercised the purchase option under both leases in
October 1969, at which time the parties executed a security agreement encumbering
both tractors. Because both leases stated that the rental obligation began running
from possession (February 17 and March 14), not the date of the leases themselves
(February 25 and April 22), the trial court held that the lessor-seller was not entitled to
super-priority because its filings were not timely. The trial court wrote:
It would be a frustration of this purpose (certainty in commercial transactions
under the U.C.C.) to hold that a purchase money secured party can deliver goods
to his debtor, delay indefinitely before entering into a security agreement which
binds the debtor retroactively as of the delivery date, and still obtain a perfected
security interest by filing within ten days of the agreement.
Id. at 882-83. The appellate panel affirmed and also distinguished Brodie Hotel
Supply, noting that in that case a secured obligation did not arise until the buyer
executed the purchase agreement, whereas the lessee-buyer in this case incurred a
secured obligation when the rents began to accrue on the possession dates.
In re Henning, 69 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1987): The creditor sold and
delivered cattle to the debtor between April 1982 and August 1984. Loan documents
were not executed until August 1984; the creditor did not file its financing statement
until August 22, 1984. The court observed that title to the cattle passed to the debtor
upon delivery, which triggered the running of the twenty-day period of the super-
priority statute. As the debtor had taken possession of the cattle more than twenty
days before the creditor filed its financing statement, the creditor's PMSI was not
entitled to super-priority. The court distinguished Brodie Hotel Supply by noting that
in that case the creditor-seller and the debtor-buyer did not reach agreement on the
terms of sale until the date of the sales contract, which was the date which started the
grace period for post-possession filing. In this case, however, the creditor and the
debtor had reached agreement on the terms of sale as of the various possession dates,
long before they executed the promissory note and security agreement. Therefore,
the twenty-day period began running from the possession date, not the date of the
promissory note and security agreement.
Iron Peddlers, Inc. v. Ivie & Assocs., Inc. (In re Ivie & Assocs., Inc.), 84 B.R.
882 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988): The seller delivered three pieces of scraping equipment
to the debtor on May 23, June 12, and June 17, 1985. The parties did not execute any
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agreement on the delivery dates. The seller filed financing statements against the first
scraper on June 27, the second scraper on June 27, and the third scraper on August 5.
The parties executed three lease agreements for the scrapers on July 31, effective as
of the respective delivery dates. Each lease agreement included a purchase option,
which the debtor exercised pursuant to a purchase contract executed September 26.
Because the parties backdated the lease agreements and the rental obligations to the
earlier dates of delivery, the court held that the debtor acquired possession of the three
scrapers under the super-priority statute upon delivery, rather than when the parties
executed the lease agreements. The Georgia super-priority statute provided for a
fifteen-day post-possession filing period, so the court found that only the seller's
filing against the second scraper was timely.
Valley Bank v. Estate of Rainsdon, 793 P.2d 1257 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990): A
cattle rancher became ill in 1981 and thereafter asked his son to care for his cattle.
The son did so, placing them with cattle that he and his wife owned. When the father
realized that he would be unable to resume his cattle-raising operation, he and his
wife agreed to sell one hundred of his best cows and calves to his son and daughter-
in-law. The parties signed a "memorandum agreement" sometime between March
31, 1982, and April 6, 1982, which recited that the sellers would retain a PMSI in the
cattle to be sold. The son and daughter-in-law also signed a promissory note. The
sellers did not file a financing statement until April 30. When the son and daughter-
in-law defaulted on their obligations to the parents and Valley Bank, all of the cattle
were sold, which triggered a priority dispute in the proceeds between the parents and
Valley Bank. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the parents
because their PMSI enjoyed super-priority since the son and daughter-in-law did not
take possession of the one hundred cattle until they actually selected the cattle in early
June. Valley Bank appealed, contending that the parents were not entitled to super-
priority because they did not file their financing statement within ten days after the
parties signed the memorandum agreement on March 23, the date that-in Valley
Bank's opinion-the son and daughter-in-law became debtors in possession of the
cattle. The appellate court agreed with Valley Bank:
We cannot accept the [parents'] argument that this selection process [from
March through early June] delayed the filing requirement. Such a rule would
inject too much uncertainty into commercial transactions. 'The Code's
generally purpose is to create a precise guide for commercial transactions under
which businessmen may predict with confidence the results of their dealings.'
Id. at 1262 (quoting NBD-Sandusky Bank v. Ritter, 446 N.W.2d 340, 341-42 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1989)). Because the parents did not timely file their financing statement,
they did not have super-priority. The court then reversed the trial court's holding and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Cockrell, 850 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. 1993): The seller sold
his mini-blind business on credit to the buyers on August 1, 1985, retaining a security
2004/05]
HeinOnline  -- 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 425 2004-2005
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
interest in the business assets. The buyers began operating the business on August 1,
although the seller continued to participate in day-to-day operations until October 3,
when he surrendered his keys. On or about that date, the buyers executed the security
agreement and signed the financing statement that the seller filed on October 7.
When the buyers defaulted on their obligations, the bank foreclosed on the mini-blind
equipment and sold it to a third party. The seller then sued the bank for conversion,
contending that its PMSI enjoyed super-priority. Resolution of the lawsuit turned on
whether the seller had filed its financing statement within twenty days after the
buyers obtained possession of the equipment. Ajury returned a verdict in favor of the
seller, but the trial court granted the bank's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict ("j.n.o.v."). The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment after
defining "possession" in terms of "exclusive possession" (evidence of which
supported the jury verdict in favor of the seller). The FDIC, as receiver for the bank,
appealed. After citing numerous cases and acknowledging divergent views, the Texas
Supreme Court held that "possession" as used in the super-priority statute should be
"interpreted in light of the impression conveyed to an observer not involved in the
transaction, not according to private limitations contained in the contract between the
buyer and seller." Id. at 465. The court continued by saying:
As commentators have noted, the UCC drafters' choice to have the purchase
money priority rule tum on "possession," rather than on when the debtor obtains
"rights" in the collateral, indicates a desire that the commencement of the grace
period be easily ascertainable....
The definition of "possession" adopted by the court of appeals implicates
these same concerns. During August and September, the equipment was located
in the warehouse that had become the [buyers'] place of business, used for the
business that the [buyers] were then managing, and operated by employees of
the [buyers]. If, despite this ostensible possession, the [buyers] were not in
"possession" within the meaning of [the super-priority statute] because [the
seller] and two of his employees retained access to the warehouse, then [the
statute's reference to] "possession" acquires a meaning different from the simple
physical control that to outside parties suggests ownership rights. Since the
duration of [the seller's] supervision of the business was a matter of agreement
between him and the [buyers], the court of appeals' interpretation would also
allow some manipulation of the grace period by the parties to the transaction,
frustrating Article 9's scheme.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Texas Supreme Court then held that the appellate
court erred in defining "possession" in terms of exclusivity, and it concluded that no
evidence supported the jury verdict favoring the seller. The court then reinstated the
trial court's j.n.o.v. in favor of the bank.
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